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Introduction
1, 2
 
The Internet started as a research project between computer engineers during the 1960s. 
When it became commercialized during the 1990s, both civil society and private sector 
actors not only started to make use of it, but also influenced its governance. Although the 
Internet is but the most recent technology in a long series of different communication 
technologies (such as telephone, teleprinters, or the radio), today Internet technology is 
nearly all-embracing. This is especially due to the fact that global communication is 
increasingly heading towards the Internet Protocol (IP) as being the main technical standard 
in communications (e.g., Voice-over IP, or VoIP).
3
 
This engagement of a whole range of diverse actors made it necessary to experiment with 
new means of governance. In this respect, the most prominent example is multi-stakeholder 
collaboration, which can be characterized as the involvement of all different actors who 
affect or who are affected by certain policies. However, as a governance model, multi-
stakeholder collaboration is still very vaguely defined and does not provide any answers 
about who is in the power to do what and when. 
One of the most prominent examples for a multi-stakeholder model is the nonprofit Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the global coordinator for the 
domain name system (DNS). Essentially, ICANN is a collection of multiple stakeholders 
coming from governments, the private sector and civil society. Each of these different groups 
has its own set of interests, values and power constellations. However, not every group holds 
the same amount of power. This has important implications for the organization as a whole. 
Since its inception in 1998, ICANN has struggled for legitimacy. It has applied a series of 
different strategies to overcome this problem, but, to date, has not succeeded. For Andrew 
Hurrell, this is not surprising. For him, “questions of legitimacy emerge whenever power is 
exercised in the context of competing interests and conflicting values.”4 In the case of ICANN, 
throughout its history, power has shifted from one stakeholder to the other, constantly. 
Nevertheless, is there anything that can be considered to be a constant characteristic for 
                                                      
1
 I want to thank Prof Otmar Höll for his trust and his patience. Also, I would like to thank Alexander Klimburg 
for his support and his vision! 
2
 N.B. In order to optimize the quality of the results of this thesis, minor parts have preliminarily been published 
in a joint publication: Klimburg, Alexander and Mirtl, Philipp, ‘Cyberspace and Governance—A Primer’, oiip 
policy paper, September 2011, 
http://www.oiip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Newsletter/Cyberspace_and_Governance-A_primer.pdf. 
3
 Kurbalija, Jovan, An Introduction to Internet Governance, Genève, DiploFoundation, 2010, p. 6. 
4
 Hurrell, Andrew, On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, p. 116. 
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multi-stakeholder collaboration? 
By looking through a security lens, we will try to tackle this question. By asking who can 
speak security in a multi-stakeholder collaboration such as ICANN, we hope to uncover some 
of the specific characteristics of this governance model.  
Essentially, this study consists of three main parts. The first one provides an in-depth 
introduction to the concept of security, viewed through the theoretical lens of the 
Copenhagen school. Here, we will look at the school’s most influential origins and provide an 
overview of both its concept of security sectors and its theory of securitization. Furthermore, 
we will introduce yet another sector to the Copenhagen school’s magnificent five. Along with 
the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors, we will also argue in 
favor of a so called cyber sector. In fact, this idea is not new. The concept of a distinct cyber 
sector was originally introduced by Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum.
5
 They argued that 
cyber security had its own distinct form, which would warrant a theoretical widening. This 
study supports their concept in that it not only applies their ideas about sector-specific 
security grammars, but also tries to develop it further. While the authors claimed that 
technical referent objects (such as computer networks) only gained legitimacy through their 
linkage to a social referent object (such as the state), they remained unclear about what 
these computer networks actually included. Was it an entire network (e.g., the Internet) that 
was linked to a social referent object or was it single components of that network (e.g., 
cables, protocols or content)? We will answer this question by introducing a four-layer model 
of cyberspace with a physical layer at the bottom, both a logical and a content layer above as 
well as social layer on top. 
The second major part of this study is aimed at setting the scene for the final case study. In 
doing so it not only provides a basic understanding for some technical issues around the 
Internet, but also contextualizes them with history and ongoing discussions as to whether 
the global network of networks is being securitized or not. We also give an overview of the 
key protocols upon which the Internet is built today and define the domain name system 
(DNS) as one of the most critical services on the Net. With this in mind, we will define the 
concept of Internet governance and its main political constellation: multi-stakeholder 
collaboration. Multi-stakeholder collaboration got a great deal of attention in context of 
Internet governance. However, it is still a rather new concept, which is why we close the 
second part of this study with a presentation about one of the most controversially discussed 
                                                      
5
 Hansen, Lene and Nissenbaum, Helen, ‘Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 53, 2009, pp. 1155-75, p. 1163. 
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multi-stakeholder platforms worldwide: the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN). 
Ultimately, we will apply our acquired theoretical and technical skills in a final case study. 
Most of the data gathering was already accomplished by the Berkman Center for Internet & 
Society at Harvard University. Thus, we can directly build upon the already published results 
and put them in context of our own cyber security framework. Through applying the 
Copenhagen school’s concept of securitization, we will try to answer the question whether 
the CEO and President of ICANN has the voice to speak security in the name of networks and 
states. 
In our final conclusion we will deliver (at least some) answers to the questions that were 
posed initially and try to derive from them some inspirations for future research in our field. 
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1. The Copenhagen School 
1.1. The Concept of Security 
The Copenhagen school emerged in the 1980s around Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver who, at 
that time, worked together at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).
6
 The name 
of the school was originally coined by Bill McSweeney who found the publications by Buzan, 
Wæver and their collaborators “sufficiently interrelated to warrant the collective shorthand, 
the ‘Copenhagen school’ of security studies.”7 
For the Copenhagen school, the concept of security follows a straightforward security form, 
or logic. In essence, “[s]ecurity means survival in the face of existential threats.”
8
 More 
precisely, security 
“is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent 
object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, 
territory, and society). The special nature of security justifies the use of extraordinary 
measures to handle them.”
9
 
This definition heavily builds upon traditional security analysis
10
 where actors (mostly states) 
strife to ensure their constantly threatened existence in absence of a central authority 
(anarchy). However, while traditionalists’11 argue in favor of objectively identifiable threats 
(e.g., the threat arising from the devastating combination of superpower rivalry and nuclear 
weapons), the Copenhagen school takes up a radically different position, claiming that there 
is no such thing as an objective measure for so called “real” threats: 
“Even if one wanted to take a more objectivist approach, it is unclear how this could 
be done except in cases in which the threat is unambiguous and immediate. (An 
example would be hostile tanks crossing the border; even here, ‘hostile’ is an 
attribute not of the vehicle but of the socially constituted relationship. A foreign tank 
                                                      
6
 In 2003 COPRI was merged into the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). 
7
 McSweeney, Bill, ‘Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school’, in Review of International Studies 
22, 1, 1996, pp.81-94. 
8
 Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 
27. 
9
 Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 
21. 
10
 See, for instance, Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, New York, Random House, 1979. 
11
 See Hansen, Lene and Buzan, Barry, The Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge et al., 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 156-86. 
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could be part of a peacekeeping force.)”12 
Therefore, instead of holding that security threats could be approached objectively (as do 
traditionalists), the Copenhagen school suggests that threats are constructed in an inter-
subjective discourse where someone in the position of power points at a specific issue and 
claims:  
“this is an existential threat with a point of no return; if we do not handle this in time, 
if we do not give it full priority, then we will not be here to tackle the other more 
mundane matters.”
13
 
More to the point, for the Copenhagen school “’security’ is what actors make it:”
14
 a process 
by which a powerful actor discursively constructs an issue as a threat to a specific referent 
object. Consequently, 
“‘[s]ecurity’ is [. . .] a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the 
issue becomes a security issue—not necessarily because a real existential threat 
exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.”
15
 
Traditionally, the state has been the only referent object within international security 
studies. However, as will become clear in the following sections, this narrow view has been 
widened considerably since the end of the Cold War. Just to name a few, today referent 
objects can include states and nations as well as rain forests and political ideologies. 
Nevertheless, this does not imply that referent objects can be appointed randomly: 
“Referent objects must establish security legitimacy in terms of a claim to survival. 
Bureaucracies, political regimes, and firms seldom hold this sense of guaranteed 
survival and thus are not usually classed as referent objects. Logically, they could try 
to establish a claim to survival and thus to security legitimacy, but empirically this is 
not usually possible.”
16
 
The reason why a referent object must hold enough security legitimacy is to mobilize 
sufficient support from the audience that is addressed to accept the security claim. Yet, if 
                                                      
12
 Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 
30. 
13
 Wæver, Ole, ‘European Security Identities’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, 1, pp. 2120-132, p. 108. 
14
 Buzan, Barry and Wæver, Ole, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 48. 
15
 Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 
24. 
16
 See Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, 
p. 39. 
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this audience does not back an object’s claim to survival, eventually taken extraordinary 
measures (e.g., a higher level of secrecy and a resulting lack of transparency, levying taxes, 
limiting otherwise inviolable rights, a limiting focus on just one single issue, etc.
17
) cannot be 
sufficiently justified. We will come back to this when explaining the concept of securitization. 
Having defined the concept of security as a discursive practice, we can now proceed in 
introducing the framework that was built around these basic assumptions. Traditionally, the 
Copenhagen school is made up of “three main ideas:”
18
 securitization,
19
 security sectors,
20
 
and regional security complexes.
21
 More recently, however, the concepts of 
macrosecuritization
22
 and security constellations23 have been added. For the purpose of this 
study, however, we will only consider the first two concepts. 
Among the Copenhagen school’s main ideas, “securitisation is what defines most distinctly 
the school in a meta-theoretical sense.”
24
 Thus, the first subsection to follow will set out the 
theoretical roots that underpin Wæver’s securitization theory. In a second move, the 
concepts of security sectors and securitization will be presented. 
1.1.1. Theoretical Origins 
The theoretical foundation for securitization theory is constituted by three distinct 
approaches. The first one was developed by linguist John L. Austin and is widely known as 
speech act theory. The second one refers to parts of Carl Schmitt’s political theory which 
includes both his concept of the political and his decisionist theory of sovereignty. 
Ultimately, the third one concerns traditionalist security debates culminating around 
                                                      
17
 See Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, 
p. 247. 
18
 Wæver, Ole, ‘Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins between Core 
and Periphery’, unpublished paper, presented at the International Studies Association’s 45
th
 Annual Convention 
in Montreal, Canada, 2004, p. 7. 
19
 See Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, 
chapter 2, pp. 21-47. 
20
 See Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998. 
21
 See Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998; 
pp. 9-20; Buzan, Barry and Wæver, Ole, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
22
 See Barry and Wæver, Ole, ‘Macrosecuritization and security constellations: reconsidering scale in 
securitization theory’, Review of International Studies, 35, pp. 253-76, 2009. 
23
 See Buzan, Barry et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998 
, pp. 201-2; Buzan, Barry and Wæver, Ole, ‘Macrosecuritization and security constellations: reconsidering scale 
in securitization theory’, Review of International Studies, 35, pp. 253-76, 2009. 
24
 See, Wæver, Ole, ‘Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins between 
Core and Periphery’, unpublished paper, presented at the International Studies Association’s 45
th
 Annual 
Convention in Montreal, Canada, 2004, p. 7. 
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Kenneth Waltz.25 Each of them shall be presented here briefly.26 
1.1.1.1. John L. Austin and John Searle  
Speech act theory was first introduced by John L. Austin and further developed by John 
Searle. Drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s language games, Austin suggests that, apart from 
the semantic meaning, a statement also has a pragmatic meaning.27 As opposed to the 
latter, the pragmatic meaning of a statement is not inherent in the words or phrases 
themselves, but results from the particular setting in which it is used (context). Yet, a speech 
act “is normally not thought of as just saying something,”
28
 but as an utterance “where by 
saying something, something is being done.”29 For instance, in the context of a wedding, 
when a priest is saying “I now pronounce you man and wife,” a marriage is being done. This 
process of creating social reality is what Austin calls a performative utterance or performative 
speech act where “the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action.”
30
 
Basically, speech acts can be broken down into three different levels. The most basic one is 
the locutionary act, which refers to the literal meaning of an utterance: “He said to me 
‘Shoot her!’, meaning by ‘shoot’, shoot and referring by ‘her’ to her.”
31
 The second level is 
the illocutionary act, which is about the pragmatic meaning of the utterance: “He urged (or 
advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her.”
32
 Finally, the perlocutionary act means the action 
that is actually induced by an utterance: “He persuaded me to shoot her.”33 For the 
Copenhagen school of security studies, however, only the illocutionary act plays a role.
34
 
By taking into account that during a speech act, “things [. . .] can be or go wrong”, Austin 
identifies six felicity conditions which are required for performative speech acts to be 
successful: 
“first, the speech act must be in line with the ‘accepted conventional procedure’ 
                                                      
25
 Hansen, Lene and Buzan, Barry, The Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge et al., Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, p. 213; Floyd, Rita, Security and the Environment. Securitisation Theory and US 
Environmental Security Policy, Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 9-23. 
26
 This overview heavily builds upon Floyd, Rita, Security and the Environment. Securitisation Theory and US 
Environmental Security Policy, Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 9-42. 
27
 Thanks to Natalia Egorova for that point. 
28
 Austin, John L., How to Do Things with Words, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 7. 
29
 Floyd, Rita, Security and the Environment. Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy, 
Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 11. 
30
 Austin, John L., How to Do Things with Words, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 5. 
31
 Austin, John L., How to Do Things with Words, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 101. 
32
 Austin, John L., How to Do Things with Words, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 101. 
33
 Austin, John L., How to Do Things with Words, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 101. 
34
 See Wæver, Ole, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Lipschutz, Ronnie D., On Security, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 49. 
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referring to the utterance itself.[. . .] Second, ‘the particular persons and 
circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular 
procedure invoked’.[. . .] Third, ‘[t]he procedure must be executed by all participants 
both correctly and [fourth] completely’.[. . .] Fifth, a person participating in a speech 
act must be sincere in her utterance. And sixth, the enunciator of the speech act must 
live in accordance with the utterance subsequently.”
35
 
The first four felicity conditions are more powerful than the last two, which is why a breach 
of felicity conditions five and six has less compromising consequences than the breach of 
conditions one to four. In fact, if the first four conditions are reneged, one can talk about the 
“misfiring” of the speech act as a whole.
36
 This becomes clearer by looking at Austin’s own 
explanation: 
“a bigamist doesn’t get married a second time, he only ‘goes through the form’ of a 
second marriage; I can’t name the ship if I am not the person properly authorized to 
name it; and I can’t quite bring off the baptism of penguins, those creatures being 
scarcely susceptible of that exploit.’”
37
 
However, Jacques Derrida objects that, in speech act theory, Austin presupposes context as a 
fixed given. Stressing that the conditions for speech acts are continuously changing, Derrida 
argues that context will never be exhaustively determinable and could therefore not be 
theorized sufficiently.38 He suggests that instead of studying context, the analyst of speech 
acts should solely focus on publicly available texts. This type of discourse analysis necessarily 
blinds out questions about an actor’s motivation for a certain speech act. Wæver supports 
this approach, which in his securitization theory leads to an exclusive focus on questions such 
as “who securitises, on what issue, under what circumstances and to what effect.”39 As 
Wæver put it in his own words: 
“security thinking does not mean how the actors think, which would be rather 
difficult to uncover—and not all that interesting. What is up for discussion here is 
how and what they think aloud. That is, the thinking they contribute to the public 
debate/political process; ‘public logic’. What we investigate is the political process—
                                                      
35
 Floyd, Rita, Security and the Environment. Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy, 
Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 12. 
36
 Austin, John L., How to Do Things with Words, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 16. 
37
 Austin, John L., ‘Speech Acts and Convention: Performative and Constative’, in Nuccetelli, Susana and Seay, 
Gary (eds.), Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p. 330. 
38
 See Derrida, Jacques, Signature event context, in Idem, Limited Inc, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 
1988, pp. 1-23. 
39
 Floyd, Rita, Security and the Environment. Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy, 
Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 16. 
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not the isolated, individual formation of ideas that are afterwards put into the 
political interplay.”
40
 
1.1.1.2. Carl Schmitt  
Another theoretical root of securitization theory has been exposed by Michael C. Williams.
41
 
In pointing at both Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political and his decisionist theory of 
sovereignty,
42
 Williams was among the first to argue “that in the Copenhagen School the 
concept of ‘security’ plays a role almost identical to that which Schmitt defined as his 
concept of ‘the political.’”
43
 However, one should keep in mind that, while formulating his 
securitization theory back in 1988, Ole Wæver was aware of, but not directly inspired by Carl 
Schmitt’s political theory.
44
 
Acknowledging that parts of Schmitt’s thinking are still influential today, it is also important 
to point out that his work remains controversial today.
45
 This is especially due to the fact 
that, as one of the most prominent jurists and political theorists in the third Reich, Schmitt 
fell prey to National Socialism.46 In this context, Williams claimed: 
“I certainly do not want to imply that it [the Copenhagen school] is implicated in the 
authoritarian politics with which Schmitt (sometimes called the ‘crown jurist of the 
Nazi Party’) is often associated. [. . .] However, I do want to argue that the specificity 
of ‘security’ as a particular kind of speech-act in the work of the Copenhagen School 
is underpinned by an understanding of the politics of enmity, decision, and 
emergency which has deep roots in Schmitt’s understanding of political order.”
47
 
Within Schmitt’s broader political theory, “the concept of the state presupposes the concept 
of the political.” In this regard, the concept of the political can typically be characterized as 
the distinction between friend and enemy—the antagonism between those who are 
                                                      
40
 Wæver, Ole, Concepts of Security, Copenhagen, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1997. 
41
 See Williams, Michael C., ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International 
Studies Quarterly, 47, 2003, pp. 511-31. 
42
 See Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1932]. 
43
 See Williams, Michael C., ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International 
Studies Quarterly, 47, 2003, pp. 511-31, p. 515. 
44
 See Wæver, Ole, ‘The Ten Works’, Tidsskriftet Politik, 4, 7, 2004. 
45
 See, for instance, Müller, Jan-Werner, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought, New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2003. 
46
 See, for instance, Gross, Raphael, Carl Schmitt und die Juden: Eine deutsche Rechtslehre, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000. 
47
 Williams, Michael C., ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 47, 2003, pp. 511-31, p. 515. 
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existentially threatened and those who are actually threatening.48 This implies that a state 
can only endure if there is an enemy. For Schmitt, however, an enemy is not just a private 
adversary whom one hates (lat. inimicus), but rather a collective public opponent (lat. 
hostis): 
“An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people 
confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because 
everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole 
nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship.” 
This friend/enemy polarity can be found in all areas of society. Every “religious, moral, 
economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms itself into a political one if it is sufficiently 
strong to group human beings according to friend and enemy.”
49
 But who has the authority 
to decide when a certain friend/enemy polarity has reached a sufficiently high tension 
(emergency situation) that would justify to take exceptional measures? 
As opposed to legal positivists, Schmitt did not believe that a state could be regulated by law 
alone—especially not in emergency situations that have not been anticipated in advance. In 
his decisionist theory of sovereignty he thus made clear that a sovereign was needed who 
was above law and constitution, and who would have the power to publicly decide upon the 
exception in order to subsequently take emergency measures. In the Weimar Republic, such 
a strong role was assigned to the President of the Reich, who—through article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution—held the authority to execute sole power in situations of national 
emergency: 
“If a state does not fulfill the obligations laid upon it by the Reich constitution or the 
Reich laws, the Reich President may use armed force to cause it to oblige.”
50
 
Convinced that the provisions of article 48 could help to relax the political tensions internal 
to the Weimar Republic, “Schmitt was among those who sought to strengthen the Weimar 
regime by trying to persuade Hindenburg to invoke the temporary dictatorial powers of 
article 48 against the extremes on the Right and the Left.”
51
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1.1.1.3. Kenneth Waltz  
The third approach that sets out the foundation for securitization theory concerns 
International Relations scholar Kenneth Waltz. Following Floyd,
52
 Kenneth Waltz matters for 
three reasons: his preference for parsimonious theory, his understanding of security and his 
concept of capabilities. 
The first reason is meta-theoretical by nature and does not say much about what Waltz 
theorized in respect to International Relations (IR). More generally, it is about his 
understanding of economizing theory. For Waltz, theory must have clear boundaries, 
otherwise it gets watered down. One must be careful in what needs to be involved and strict 
in what is by definition outside of a theory. As Waltz points out: 
“The construction of theory is a primary task. One must decide which things to 
concentrate on in order to have a good chance of devising some explanations of the 
international patterns and events that interest us. To believe that we can proceed 
otherwise is to take the profoundly unscientific view that everything that varies is a 
variable.”
53
 
Recalling the discussion on either including context in speech act theory (as suggested by 
Austin) or excluding it (as objected by Derrida), it should be clear now, why Wæver—in 
support for Derrida’s approach—ultimately kept context outside of his securitization theory: 
“the inclusion of context (though perhaps drawing a clearer picture of the world than 
securitisation theory currently can) would change the theory beyond recognition, 
moving the focus away from the act that is securitisation, towards a causal theory of 
securitisation instead.”
54
 
The second reason why Waltz matters for securitization theory derives from his 
understanding of security. In his seminal work Theory of International Politics Waltz 
suggested anarchy to be the ordering principle of the international system. Without a 
Leviathan, actors live in constant fear of each other and struggle to survive (homo homini 
lupus). As long as a state cannot secure its own existence in face of anarchy, it will ultimately 
stop to exist.55 This understanding also gained support in securitization theory. The fact that 
security is ultimately about survival implies here that speaking security not only means that 
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something is threatened, but—more urgently—something is threatened existentially. Only 
by referring to an existential threat, extraordinary measures can eventually be legitimately 
taken: 
“The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to 
handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of 
force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take 
special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state 
representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development”56 
Lastly, Waltz is important here because of his concept of capabilities. In anarchy, a state best 
secures its survival by increasing its power. It essentially does so by extending its capabilities. 
For Waltz these include material factors such as the size of population and territory, resource 
endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.
57
 The 
more capabilities a state has at its disposal, the more powerful it is and the less likely it can 
be brought down by other states. 
While supplementing Waltz’s concept of capabilities with social (social networks of 
relationships) and cultural factors (e.g., knowledge, skills or education),
58
 also securitization 
theory makes use of this idea. Similar to Waltz’ theory of international politics (where not 
everyone has the capability to survive) in securitization theory not everyone has the 
capability to perform a successful speech act: 
“The more capabilities a securitizing actor has, the more likely will this actor be to 
succeed in an attempted securitization. In other words, who can or cannot securitize 
is already inscribed into the position of the actor within the social hierarchy of the 
system.”59 
1.1.2. Main Ideas 
After this short side note on the Copenhagen school’s theoretical origins, we can now 
proceed by concentrating on those ideas that seem to be relevant for the purpose of this 
study: security sectors and securitization theory. For a better understanding, each of them 
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shall be presented here roughly. 
1.1.2.1. Security Sectors  
Through applying a constructivist view of security as a discursive construct—where by saying 
something, something is being done—the Copenhagen school does not only challenge the 
traditionalists’ concept of “real” and “objectively” existing threats, but also goes beyond 
their exclusive focus on military security. As mentioned above, the two schools agree that 
the main form (or logic) of security is survival in the face of an existential threat. However, 
instead of equating this overarching security form with military security, the Copenhagen 
school argues that military security is but one possible sub-form within a wider security 
spectrum: 
“Security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. Security 
means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential 
threat is not the same across different sectors.”
60
 
The desire to conceptualize security across multiple sectors must be understood in light of 
the widespread dissatisfaction during the 1980s to view international security almost 
exclusively through the traditionalists’ military lens. Members of the Copenhagen school and 
proponents of other widening debates (including constructivism, post-colonialism, human 
security, critical security studies and poststructuralism
61
) claimed that nonmilitary aspects 
such as international economics, energy and resources, climate and ecology, as well as 
transnational drug trade and demography also had some relevance for the field of 
international security studies. However, it was not before the end of the Cold War—when 
the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was perceived to be contained—that the 
analytical widening of the field was generally accepted.62 Along with the military sector, in 
the 1990s the Copenhagen school thus identified four more sectors that could be applied by 
security analysts. Originally, these included an environmental, economic, societal and 
political sector. However, as will be mentioned in one of the later sections, this set has 
recently been extended by both a humanitarian
63
 and a cyber sector.
64
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Understanding security along different sectors is not to say that these sectors should be 
perceived as totally detached from each other. They should rather be seen as “analytical 
lenses” through which one can focus on world affairs.
65
 For instance, if, in a given conflict, 
war were “a mere continuation of politics by other means,”
66
 exclusively applying the 
military lens for looking at the conflict would potentially blind out the underlying political 
logic.
67
 For analysts it is therefore necessary to apply the most suitable lens through which to 
scrutinize specific issues.  
Dividing international security into multiple security discourses has proved to be a useful 
analytical device to facilitate security analysis.68 However, speaking in terms of philosophy of 
science, their theoretical roots and ontological standing have long remained rather vague. In 
an attempt to push sectors beyond their analytical quality and put them onto more solid 
ground, Albert and Buzan have recently
69
 suggested to link them to the sociological framing 
of “functional differentiation.”70 
Since each of the five originally defined sectors differ in their respective security agenda, 
units of analysis, and sub-forms of security, it is useful to look at them in more depth. In 
doing so, the following subsections will provide an introduction to each of the sector-specific 
security agenda. For illustrative purposes, the characteristic units of analysis and sub-forms 
of security are set out in the context of the section on securitization. In order to deliver a 
clear overview, however, these observations are drawn together in a table attached to the 
closing synthesis. 
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1.1.2.1.1. Military Sector 
The military sector is traditionally considered to be a state domain which is shaped by the 
instruments of force a state has at its disposal. However, the security agenda can be split into 
a domestic (or internal) dimension on the one hand, and an interstate (or external) 
dimension on the other one. 
At the internal level, the military sector touches upon the maintenance of civil order and 
peace. These properties can be threatened by a variety of different actors, such as militant 
separatists, rebels, terrorists and other actors opposed to the respective state authority: 
“When the perceived threat is internal, military security is primarily about the ability 
of the ruling elite to maintain civil peace, territorial integrity, and, more 
controversially, the machinery of government in the face of challenges from its 
citizens.”
71
 
At the external level, the military sector is about the state’s territorial integrity towards other 
actors within the international system. Here, the security agenda is primarily concerned 
about how states equip themselves to use force, and how this “arms race” is perceived by 
other states: 
“When securitization is focused on external threats, military security is primarily 
about the two-level interplay between the actual armed offensive and defensive 
capabilities of states on the one hand and their perceptions of each other’s 
capabilities and intentions on the other.”72 
1.1.2.1.2. Environmental Sector 
In the environmental sector the difference between the scientific agenda on the one hand, 
and the political agenda on the other, has been defined as a distinctive feature: 
“The scientific agenda is about the authoritative assessment of threat for securitizing 
or desecuritizing moves, whereas the political agenda deals with the formation of 
concern in the public sphere about these moves and the allocation of collective 
means by which to deal with these issues raised.”
73
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Although this division can also be found in other security sectors, the exceptional complexity 
of environmental issues as well as their far-reaching linkages and potential consequences 
intensify the need for political actors to rely on the expertise of an environmental scientific 
community: 
“The particular difficulty in dealing with the cumulative global effects of local 
developments, as well as in many cases threat assessment within a time frame 
beyond present generations, causes this specific form of dependence upon scientific 
authority.”
74
 
The scientific agenda is embedded in scientific discourse and constructed outside the core of 
politics.75 It is formulated by a transgovernmental and transnational “network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”
76
 While 
the professionals of such a network can have different disciplinary backgrounds, 
epistemically speaking, they must share a common set of established academic standards 
(e.g., shared causal beliefs or notions of validity). This is why in international relations theory 
these networks have been referred to as “epistemic communities.”
77
 In this respect, the 
environmental epistemic community sets out a wide spectrum of issues and communicates 
them to the press as well as to political elites. Such issues can range from the disruption of 
ecosystems and civil strife to energy, population, food, and economic problems.
78
 
The political agenda, on the other hand, is embedded in the wider public discourse and 
constructed by “governmental, media, and public standards which are influenced much 
more by short-term events.”
79
 It can be formulated by a governmental and 
intergovernmental community, and includes public policies addressing the issues that have 
already been set out in the scientific agenda. In this regard, the political agenda is about 
three areas: 
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“(1) state and public awareness of issues on the scientific agenda (how much of the 
scientific agenda is recognized by policymakers, their electorates, and their 
intermediaries—the press); (2) the acceptance of political responsibility for dealing 
with these issues; and (3) the political management questions that arise: problems of 
international cooperation and institutionalization—in particular regime formation, 
the effectiveness of unilateral national initiatives, distribution of costs and benefits, 
free-rider dilemmas, problems of enforcement, and so forth.”
80
 
Despite their characteristic distinction, both are highly interdependent and often overlap in 
public discourse.81 Moreover, it is important to note that in the early phases of regime 
building, scientific actors play a crucial role in political agenda-setting. When a new topic 
arises at the political horizon, uncertainty about the potential outcomes of political action is 
relatively high. This increases the chances for epistemic communities to get involved in 
politics and enhances their power to put their own issues on the political agenda: 
“These actors are often involved in both science and politics: for example, scientists 
who are attentive to political logic—for instance, who are aware of the necessity to 
develop scientific consensus positions—but who are also obliged to avoid being 
stabbed in the back scientifically. Typically, these actors will link up with political 
actors who have specialized in relating to the field of science; thus, a chain forms 
from science to politics without the two having to meet in their pure forms [. . .].”
82
 
1.1.2.1.3. Economic Sector 
The economic sector offers a wide range of highly politicized debates. These are deeply 
rooted in the controversies among a diverse set of ideological positions, with each stressing 
its specific agenda of preferred issues: 
“The main contending positions reflect different views about whether states and 
societies or markets should have priority and whether private economic actors have 
security claims of their own that must be weighed against the verdict of the 
market.”83 
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Referring to the discipline of international political economy (IPE)—which examines both 
states and markets—the Copenhagen school identifies (neo-)mercantilist, liberal, and 
socialist doctrines as the three most defining ideological positions within the economic 
sector:
84
 
The (neo-)mercantilist doctrine gives state intervention priority over the free play of market 
forces. It is based on the assumption that the international economic system can be 
described as a zero-sum game: the benefit of one state equals the loss of another one. Thus, 
in terms of international trade, government intervention had to encourage exports while, at 
the same time, restricting imports as much as possible. By having exports exceeding imports, 
the resulting trade surplus guaranteed economic security insofar as the generated wealth 
could be used for national purposes (such as war and conquest). 
As opposed to the (neo-)mercantilist ideology, the liberal doctrine argued in favour of the 
free play of market forces. Economic relations are seen as a non-zero-sum game in which 
every merchandizing party potentially benefits. Instead of regulating trade, the state should 
provide basic institutions (such as the military, police and courts) that enable individuals to 
move safely between national economies. 
The socialist doctrine lies somewhat in between the two previously mentioned ideological 
positions. It basically agrees that the economy is an essential part of the social system. 
Nonetheless, considered by itself, the free play of market forces does not guarantee a 
beneficial outcome for everyone. Therefore, the state needs to control the economy up to 
the point where justice and equity can sufficiently be assured. 
Having identified the three most eminent economic ideologies, it is important to add that in 
the aftermath of the Cold War, the discourse on economic security was pre-eminently 
shaped by a liberal agenda including security issues such as the ability of states to sustain 
military capabilities independently from the global market, the economic dependence of 
states on foreign (scarce) resources, the worries that the global market would generate 
inequalities, the illegal trade in drugs and weapons (especially those of mass destruction), 
and the fears that systematic crisis could trigger government intervention.85 
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1.1.2.1.4. Societal Sector 
The societal or socio-cultural
86
 sector is about the security of a collective “we” identity. It is 
about the subjective feeling of together constituting an entity; be it a small group of people 
(such as a family, friends, or sports teams), a community (such as “we artists”), a nation (such 
as “we Austrians”), or a civilizational and religious identity (such as “we Europeans,” or “we 
Muslims”).
87
 However, the societal sector is neither about social security (which is basically 
about individuals and their economic status), nor is it about the population of a specific state 
(which only applies to the people who physically live within a relevant territory). Likewise, 
the notion of “nation” does not always refer to the same concept of collective identity. 
Sometimes a nation can be defined by language, other times by blood or culture.
88
 
Therefore, 
“[f]or international security analysis, the key to society is those ideas and practices 
that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, the 
self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members 
of a community. [. . .] Definitional, societal security is about large, self-sustaining 
identity groups; what these are empirically varies in both time and place.”
89
 
With the collective identity, also the security agenda changes through different eras and 
regions. However, the most common issues that have often posed threats to societal security 
can be summarized as migration (identity is changing due to a shift in the composition of 
members of a community), horizontal competition (identity is changing due to the 
unintended effects posed by another identity), vertical competition (identity is changing due 
to the intended effects posed by another identity), and depopulation (identity is changing 
due to plague, war, famine or natural catastrophe).
90
 
1.1.2.1.5. Political Sector 
The political sector is the widest of all sectors: “In some sense, all security is political.”
91
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Thus, it is crucial to be clear about what exactly is meant by the terms politics and political 
security. Broadly speaking, politics can be defined as “the shaping of human behavior for the 
purpose of governing large groups of people.”
92
 In reference to Machiavelli, this process of 
shaping can be characterized as “a continuous struggle to establish the quasi-permanence of 
an ordered public realm within a sea of change.”93 For the Copenhagen school, such a quasi-
permanent (or stable) order can imply any kind of political unit, described as “collectivity that 
has gained a separate existence distinct from its subjects”
94
 (such as tribes, firms, churches, 
states or empires), and any form of political patterns (such as structures, processes, and 
(interunit) institutions like the international society
95
 or international law).
96 
In this context, the political security agenda is basically about ensuring organizational 
stability. It is about framing politics through both internal and external recognition: 
“the critical variables are obviously the recognition of such an arrangement from 
within and without that lends it legitimacy and thereby the stability needed for 
political activities to be framed by it rather than to be about it.”97 
Similar to the military sector, one can distinguish between internal and external issues. While 
internal issues might include the constitutive ideas defining a political unit or pattern, 
external issues can contain questions about the recognition or non-recognition of quasi-
states such as the Palestine Liberation Organization.
98
 
1.1.2.2. Securitization  
It is worthwhile recalling what we already know from the above mentioned: Instead of 
focussing on objective threats that exclusively arise within the narrow scope of the military 
sector, the Copenhagen school looks at security as an inter-subjective process by which a 
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powerful actor discursively constructs an issue as an existential threat to a referent object 
within a specific security sector in order to legitimately employ extraordinary measures. As 
the shorthand for this description, Ole Wæver came up with the term securitization, which 
he defined as follows: 
“The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is 
not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself 
that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, 
naming a ship). What we can study is this practice: Who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security 
successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects?”99 
However, by definition, a performative speech act alone does not create an instance of 
successful or “complete securitization.”
100
 The mere utterance whereby a securitizing actor 
identifies a referent object as being existentially threatened just constitutes a securitizing 
move. Only if this attempted securitization is also accepted by a relevant audience, securitization 
is complete: 
“We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be 
adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough 
resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize 
emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the 
discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity. 
If no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk only of a securitizing move, not of an 
object actually being securitized.”
101
 
Once an issue is successfully securitized it is elevated from the normal run of political 
practice to a level of existential immediacy. The reason for an actor to perform a 
securitization is to break free from procedures and rules he would otherwise be bound to. 
Once an issue is successfully moved to the realm of emergency politics, the securitizing actor 
can legitimately employ extraordinary measures to deal with it. In this way, 
“[s]ecurity is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game 
and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. 
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Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization.”102 
In order to distinguish securitized issues from non-securitized issues, the Copenhagen school 
provides a spectrum along which one can find different issue categories: If security issues 
“do not command political and/or media attention and [. . .] are regulated through 
consensual and technical measures,”
103
 they can be categorized as non-politicized.
104
 If, at 
some point, issues “are devoted to close media and political scrutiny, generating debate and 
usually multiple policy approaches, while not commanding the threat-urgency modality of 
securitization,”
105
 one can refer to them as being politicized.
106
 Moreover, if an issue “is 
presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions 
outside the normal bounds of political procedure”
107
 it is considered to be securitized. 
This resulting spectrum does not presuppose a mandatory sequence where an issue can only 
be securitized after first having been successfully elevated from the non-politicized to the 
politicized level. In environmental security, for instance, issues can immediately be 
securitized coming from outside any political or media attention. Moreover, it is important to 
add that, for an issue to be either politicized or securitized, it does not necessitate a state to 
do so. In fact, both “politicization as well as securitization can be enacted in other fora as 
well.”
108
 
Whether an issue becomes securitized or not is a matter of politics. Recalling one of the 
definitions delivered in the opening section, security is what states make it. Essentially, this 
means that actors have a choice about what they do with a certain issue: They can ignore it, 
deal with it as part of political routine or present it as an existential threat. For the 
Copenhagen school, however, securitization is not a desirable condition—quite the contrary. 
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Wæver demands “Less security, more politics!”,109 and claims: 
“Our belief [. . .] is not ‘the more security the better.’ Basically, security should be 
seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally, politics 
should be able to unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary 
elevation of specific ‘threats’ to a prepolitical immediacy.”
110
 
Nonetheless, sometimes it might be useful to securitize an issue for tactical reasons. Again, 
this is especially true for the environmental sector, where securitization is often conceived as 
the only way how an issue could publicly receive the attention needed to deal with it at all. 
However, in the long-run it is more desirable to politicize issues and thus remove them from 
emergency politics to public discourse. This is why the Copenhagen school introduces a 
fourth category of issues referred to as desecuritized issues, meaning issues that are 
removed from the emergency status into political discourse.
111
 
The size or significance of an instance of securitization can vary. A way to measure and thus 
distinguish important cases of securitization from unimportant ones is to look at the 
cascading effects a securitization has on other security issues and securitizations. The more 
chain reactions a securitization provokes within and across sectors, the more important it 
can be considered to be.
112
 
For the Copenhagen school, security analysis is mostly interested in successful instances of 
(de)securitization. However, it also acknowledges unsuccessful and partially successful cases 
of (de)securitization. These instances are interesting 
“primarily for the insights they offer into the stability of social attitudes toward 
security legitimacy, the process by which those attitudes are maintained or changed, 
and the possible future direction of security politics.”
113
 
Lastly, securitization can either occur ad hoc or institutionalized.
114
 Since many 
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environmental issues are still relatively new and controversially discussed, they are 
securitized if needed and have not yet become a conventional practice. If, by contrast, a 
threat is perceived to be persistent and recurrent, they become institutionalized. This is most 
obvious in the military sector “where states have long endured threats of armed coercion or 
invasion and in response have built up standing bureaucracies, procedures, and military 
establishments to deal with those threats.”
115
 In the case of institutionalized securitizations, 
threats have lost both their surprising effect and their dramatic flavor. However, as opposed 
to desecuritization, institutionalized securitizations still operate in the threat/urgency mode. 
1.1.2.2.1. Facilitating Conditions 
Based on Austin’s felicity conditions, Wæver identifies three facilitating conditions
116
 which 
he defines as “conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the 
act misfires or is abused.”
117
 However, as opposed to the felicity conditions set out by Austin, 
Wæver’s facilitating conditions cannot be subdivided into conditions that facilitate a speech 
act more powerfully than others. Instead, the Copenhagen school implicitly assumes the 
unexceptional fulfillment of all three conditions.
118
 
The first condition relates to the “logical, rhetorical or semiotic structure”
119
 of the speech 
act. This does not imply that the securitizing actor needs to use the word “security” correctly, 
but that he has to follow the main form of security and “construct a plot that includes 
existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out.”
120
 However, since the security 
form can vary across different security sectors, the securitizing actor needs to apply the 
sector-specific sub-form or grammar of security. If this requirement is not met, the relevant 
audience will have trouble to understand the attempted securitization correctly and the 
speech act will consequently misfire. The different plots or narratives within the specific 
security sectors can be summed up as follows: 
1. In the military sector, the characteristic plot is mainly focused on sovereignty and has 
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traditionally been constructed around military force (e.g., the opponent’s army), 
geography (e.g., closeness
121
 and terrain
122
), history (e.g., past experiences and 
present perceptions) and politics (e.g., contradicting ideologies, recognition and 
status).
123
  
2. In the environmental sector, the characteristic plot is mainly focused on sustainability 
and built around nature-caused threats (e.g., earthquakes), human-caused threats 
that seem to cause existential damage to civilization (e.g., CFCs
124
), and human-
caused threats that do not seem to cause existential damage to civilization (e.g., the 
depletion of minerals that can be replaced by alternative substances, such as copper 
by silicon, or metal by ceramics).
125
 
3. In the economic sector, the plot has traditionally been focused on the sovereign 
economy and constructed around different actors: For individuals, the security logic 
can be constructed around basic human needs (e.g., adequate food, water, clothing, 
shelter, education). When speaking about firms, one can refer to risks of boycotts and 
risks of investment. When enquiring into the economic security of states, an analyst 
might be interested in state bankruptcy.126 Traditionally, however, security policy in 
the economic sector can mainly be found in relation to state sovereignty. As already 
mentioned, a firm, for instance, rarely has a legitimate right to survive through itself, 
but only through its link to the state’s claim to survive as a sovereign economy (e.g., a 
company employing a critical mass of citizens).127 
4. In the societal sector, the plot is mainly focused on identity: “If a society is no longer 
itself, it has not survived.”
128
  The narrative can be constructed in manifold ways. If 
the social identity is based on separateness, for instance, foreigners can potentially 
be seen as threatening. If, by contrast, identity is tied to specific cultural habits, 
foreign cultural habits (e.g., McDonald’s) can be perceived as threatening. 
Furthermore, if identity is constructed around a certain language (e.g., French), 
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English as the contemporary lingua franca can possibly pose a societal threat.129 
5. In the political sector, the security plot is focused on sovereignty and has traditionally 
been built around the idea of the state (including organizing ideologies such as 
democracy, capitalism or communism), its governing institutions (containing the 
legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, as well as the laws, procedures and 
norms by which they operate), and the physical base at its disposal (implying both the 
population and the territory).
130
 
The second facilitating condition is connected to the authority of the securitizing actor. The 
ability of a securitizing actor to conduct a successful securitization depends upon the social 
position he holds.
131
 His position in the social hierarchy defines his relationship to the 
relevant audience. This relationship is shaped by the capabilities of the enunciator. As was 
mentioned earlier, the more capabilities a securitizing actor has, the more likely will this 
actor be to succeed in an attempted securitization. In other words, who can or cannot 
securitize is already inscribed into the position of the actor within the social hierarchy of the 
system. 
Finally, the third condition is threat related. It is more likely for a security threat to be 
invoked if the issues that are referred to as threatening are commonly conceived as such 
(e.g., tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters); although, inter-subjectively speaking, 
such objects “never make for necessary securitization”
132
 themselves. 
1.1.2.2.2. Levels of Analysis 
Securitizations can essentially be examined along the traditional IR spectrum of different 
levels of analysis including the micro (individual), meso or middle (unit), and macro level 
(system). However, as opposed to the traditionalists’ state centrism in international security 
studies—emphasizing statesmen (at the micro level), the state (at the meso level), and the 
interstate system (at the macro level)
133
—, the Copenhagen school argues in favor of a more 
comprehensive framework that accounts for both state and non-state actors. It holds that 
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“[t]here is no necessity for levels to privilege states”134 and concedes:  
“We have designed our theory so that it can accommodate nonstate actors, and even 
allow them to be dominant.”
135
 
However, even though the Copenhagen school rules out the idea that states are the only 
significant actors in international security analysis, it does not go so far as to argue in favor of 
a concept of individual security. Rather, it “still privileges collective security concepts”136 
where one collective entity differentiates itself from a collective Other. As will become clear 
in the six-tiered categorization presented below, this theoretical preference reaches its limits 
both at the bottom (with the individual lacking the “collective” component) and at the top 
end (with the total collective Self of humankind lacking the opposition of an “Other”). With 
this in mind, the Copenhagen school sets out the following six levels of analysis:
137
 
1. Individual level: Individual actors are at the very bottom end of any security 
analysis.
138
 However, the Copenhagen school maintains that “the individual himself is 
in no position to provide for his own security.”
139
 They will seldom claim security 
legitimacy in their own right because they “do not appear in political discourse as 
free-standing entities, but with gendered, racial, religious, class, and other collective 
identities.”
140
 
2. Subunit level: Similar to individuals, small groups at the subunit level seldom hold a 
legitimate claim to survival. Here, one can find bureaucracies, and political regimes as 
well as firms and lobbies. As mentioned in the opening section, these groups could try 
to establish a claim to survival and thus to security legitimacy, but empirically this is 
not usually possible. However, they can unfold the power to affect the 
(de)securitizations of their superior unit level. 
3. Unit level: At the unit level individual collectivities engage in interdependent 
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securitizations with each other. Here, the audiences have been coherent, and the 
processes of differentiation powerful enough to establish strong interpretive 
communities that are able to construct their own Self/Other, or friends/enemies 
perceptions (“we” feeling). Traditionally, the unit level was limited to states and 
nations, but can also include transnational actors (TNAs) such as multinational 
corporations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), mafias and 
terrorist groups as well as anti-nuclear and anti-globalization groups.
141
 This level has 
long been the focal point for mainstream IR analysis. However, due to advancing 
regional and international dynamics, higher levels of analysis have also gained 
attention. 
4. Subsystem level: The subsystem level is mainly about different groups of units 
interacting with each other within the international system. It accounts for different 
groups of units that can either be territorially coherent (e.g., regional security 
complexes) or not (e.g., OECD or AOSIS). 
5. System level: The system level is about the interplay between units, subsystemic 
groups of units and great-powers building their respective Self/Other perceptions. 
“Currently, this level encompasses the entire planet, but in earlier times several more 
or less disconnected international systems existed simultaneously,”
142
 such as the 
relatively free-standing international systems of the “warring states” period in China 
(ca. 403-221 BC) or the Ganges valley civilization between the seventh and the fourth 
centuries BC.
143
 Since before 1500 “the global level was not strong enough to 
generate a global world system”,
144
 these “separate systems were not regions 
(subsystems) but really worlds.”
145
 
6. Global level: The global level is the top end of any (contemporary) security analysis. It 
is the overarching level “where the absence of an Other makes it difficult to securitize 
the total collective Self of humankind.”
146
 It is about the physical fate of humankind 
as a whole, and can incorporate concerns about nuclear weapons as well as global 
warming.  
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If, at some point, the collective Self of humankind happens to perceive “unknown 
unknowns”
147
 such as “Alien Others” (perhaps even similar to those depicted in Star Trek), 
“Robot Others” (like those anticipated in Battlestar Galactica)
148
 or zombies (famously 
appearing in movies such as Night of the Living Dead)
149
 as threats to its very existence, this 
six-tiered categorization might be further expanded. However, even though UFOs already 
appear to threaten “anthropomorphic sovereignty,”
150
 for the purpose of this study, the 
world provides a sufficient framework to analytically distinguish between micro (individual 
and subunit), middle (unit) and macro level (subsystem, system and global). 
1.1.2.2.3. Units of Analysis 
In securitization theory, one distinguishes between three different units of analysis: referent 
objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors.
151
 These will be presented here briefly. For 
a better illustration, the unit’s theoretical characteristics shall be complemented by 
examples from the respective sectors. 
Historically, international security studies have mainly focused on the state as the one and 
only unit of analysis. However, by acknowledging that the state still occupies a privileged 
standing within the discipline, the Copenhagen school intentionally sets out a very broad 
definition of what they understand a referent object should be defined as. In this context, 
referent objects have been characterized as 
“things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim 
to survive. [. . .] The referent object is that to which one can point and say, ‘It has to 
survive, therefore it is necessary to…’.”
152
 
Referent objects can be found at the micro level (individuals and small groups speaking for 
themselves), the middle level (collectivities such as states, nations, or civilizations), and the 
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macro level (such as the nature, humankind, international working class, liberal world 
economy or free trade). At the micro and macro level it is very difficult to legitimately 
establish a right for protection. Individuals and small groups rarely have the necessary 
legitimacy to speak security effectively. Similarly, at the global level it is still a challenge to 
securitize issues across nations: 
“Somehow the system-level candidates are still too subtle and indirect to trigger the 
levels of mass identity necessary for securitization.”
153
 
However, over the last centuries actors at the middle level have been most successful in 
securitizing issues. Directly referring to Michel Foucault’s idea about a “site of judgment,”
154
 
for the Copenhagen school this is especially due to the fact that each unit at the middle level 
can successfully form a “we” that serves as an interpretive community which can clearly 
identify itself as opposed to others. The most prominent referent objects proposed by the 
Copenhagen school can be read as follows: 
1. In the military sector, the most important referent object is the state which is 
narrowly defined as the single holder of military power. Also, would-be states 
claiming a status as actors at the unit level can fall within this category. The same is 
true for actors at the subsystem or system levels (e.g., WEU/EU, NATO).
155
 
2. In the environmental sector, the ultimate referent object is not the nature or “Mother 
Earth” itself, but human enterprise that would perish without it. Therefore, it is not 
crucial to maintain the global ecosystem as such, but to do so because mankind is 
dependent upon it: “The earth has been in its place for billions of years, and what has 
been happening on its crust since, say, the Industrial revolution is rather 
unimportant.[156] [. . .] Thus, in the environmental sector two different kinds of 
referent objects represent two wings within the environmental movement: the 
environment itself and the nexus of civilization and environment.”
157
 
3. In the economic sector, referent objects can include individuals, classes, states, firms, 
and the liberal international economic order. The most important ones, however, are 
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firms that search protection through states and the liberal economic order.158 
4. In the societal sector, the referent object is the collective identity of a certain group 
that is threatened; the “we” loyalties of a clan, a tribe, a region, a religion a race or a 
nation that are defined in contrast to other communities.
159
 
5. In the political sector, the territorial state is the most prominent referent object. 
However, other state-like organizations such as quasi-superstates (e.g., the EU), self-
organized, but stateless societal groups with strong institutions (e.g., tribes or 
minorities), and transnational movements (e.g., the Catholic Church, the Muslims or 
the communists) can also reach this status—even if they are not formally recognized 
by the interstate society.
160
 
Alongside a whole range of possible referent objects at the micro, middle, and system level, 
a second unit of analysis is defined as securitizing actors. Securitizing actors can be 
characterized as 
“actors who securitize issues by declaring something—a referent object—existentially 
threatened. [. . .] [S]omeone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. 
Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, 
lobbyists, and pressure groups.”
161
 
In face of such a broad definition, every individual could arbitrarily be said to be a securitizing 
actor. However, for the Copenhagen school the decisive qualification for an actor to be able 
to execute a speech act is the position he holds within a social community (concept of 
capabilities). This position can either be assigned by formal rules, or the trust and confidence 
a community places in certain individuals or groups. The government, for instance, can be 
assumed to have the legal authority to speak “on behalf” of a certain state. In this respect, 
the prime minister is most likely to securitize a threat to the state. However, he can also fail. 
Moreover, the government’s representatives are not the only ones who could successfully 
conduct a speech act. Other political parties or pressure groups can potentially gain enough 
attention to do so too. The most prominent securitizing actors highlighted by the 
Copenhagen school are the following: 
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1. In the military sector, securitizing actors are typically state representatives and other 
officials, the United Nations General Secretary, intelligence services, mafias, gangs, 
clans, tribes or rebels.
162
 
2. In the environmental sector, securitizing actors can be divided in lead actors who have 
a strong commitment to global action (such as states and non-governmental 
organizations, or NGOs, like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund), support actors 
who do not have the resources to be in a lead position (especially most parts of the 
developing world), and both veto actors (such as emerging economies and parts of 
industries), as well as veto coalitions (such as the US-based Global Climate Coalition) 
that try to downgrade environmental issues.
163
 
3. In the economic sector, securitizing actors can be found at two different levels. At the 
local level a firm might be protected by individuals, trade unions, city governments, 
or local political representatives. At the national level possible securitizing actors are 
trade unions and the state government in pursuit of economic security.
164
 
4. In the societal sector, there are many different actors who potentially can securitize 
an issue. These actors include official and semiofficial leaders who claim to speak on 
behalf of a certain group. For a nation it is most likely the state government that 
securitizes an issue.
165
 
5. In the political sector, securitizing actors are comparatively well defined. Thanks to 
established institutions, the authority to frame an issue as a security question is 
clearer here than in other sectors. For a state it is usually the authorized leaders who 
can speak security. The same is true for the EU and most institutionalized 
organizations and movements.
166
 
After having characterized both referent objects and securitizing actors, functional actors can 
ultimately be defined as 
“actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the 
actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who 
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significantly influences decisions in the field of security.”167 
This category encompasses all those actors who have a significant influence on security 
making in general. With respect to securitization, this includes the processes before, during, 
and after securitization. However, these actors do not intend to be referent objects and do 
not securitize issues as existential threats. Some of the most prominent functional actors can 
be highlighted as follows: 
1. In the military sector, functional actors can be different agencies of force such as 
assassins, mercenary companies, armies, defense bureaucracies, the arms industry, 
or defense, finance and foreign ministries.
168
 
2. In the environmental sector, functional actors can be seen as those who are actually 
causing the problem. It is the actors whose behavior affects the ecosystem but who 
neither politicize nor securitize themselves. Examples are economic actors (such as 
transnational corporations, state firms, agricultural, chemical, and nuclear industries, 
fishing, mining etc.), governments and Intergovernmental organizations (such as the 
United Nations Environmental Program or the Food and Agriculture Organization).
169
 
3. In the economic sector, the firm affects the security dynamics within the sector most 
notably. However, it is also governments and Intergovernmental organizations (such 
as the World Trade Organization or the World Bank) that play a role here.170 
4. In the societal sector, especially the media plays an important role. Without actually 
securitizing an issue, the media interprets the dynamics and can, therefore, affect the 
processes of framing the “us” on the one hand and the “them” on the other.
171
 
5. In the political sector, one can imagine a broad variety of different functional actors 
ranging from the (international) media, to governments and (I)NGOs.
172
 
1.1.2.2.4. Methodology 
Studying securitization means to tackle questions about “who securitizes, on what issues 
(threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what 
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conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful).”173 To answer these 
questions comprehensively, the Copenhagen school suggests studying both discourse and 
political constellations.
174
 
In terms of discourse analysis, Wæver supports Jacques Derrida’s approach to blind out 
context and exclusively focus on publicly available text: 
“The analysis should be conducted on texts that are central in the sense that if 
security discourse is operative in this community, it should be expected to materialize 
in this text because this occasion is sufficiently important.”
175
 
Against this backdrop, an analyst of securitization should not be expected to reveal 
“underlying motives, hidden agenda, or such.”
176
 For Wæver “[d]iscourse analysis can [only] 
uncover one thing: discourse.”177 Thus, instead of using “sophisticated linguistic or 
quantitative techniques”
178
 to uncover secret subtext, the analyst should rather listen closely 
to what actors think aloud in public debate: 
“The technique is simple: Read, looking for arguments that take the rhetorical and 
logical form defined here as security.”
179
 
In addition to discourse, the analyst should also pay attention to the political constellations 
and processes that accompany the securitization. This makes it necessary to not only 
concentrate on text, but also to look closer at the interacting units and facilitating 
conditions.
180
 
1.2. Cyber Sector 
The sectoral approach of the Copenhagen school originally contained a set of five distinct 
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sectors. Each of them was identified by their characteristic security agenda, units of analysis, 
and sub-forms or grammars of security. In recent years, however, proponents of the 
Copenhagen school have suggested to add additional sectors.
181
 One of them is the cyber 
sector.
182
  
Most basically, cyberspace can be defined as the “world behind your screen.”
183
 However, 
today there is a broad variety of different definitions of cyberspace.
184
 One of the first to be 
used in politics was put forward in the aftermath of 9/11. As part of the 2003 US National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, cyberspace has been described as a national “nervous 
system” that controls the country’s critical infrastructure. While highlighting the role of 
public-private engagement, the strategy stated: 
“Cyberspace is composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers, 
servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables that allow our critical infrastructures 
to work. Thus, the healthy functioning of cyberspace is essential to our economy and 
our national security.”185  
Five years later, in 2008, a similar definition was put forward in US President George W. 
Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive 54, also known as Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23).
186
 This document established the 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI);
 187
 a still partially classified
188
 USD 17 
billion program designed to protect Federal Government systems against intrusion 
attempts.
189
 In this context, the directive defines cyberspace as 
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“the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes 
the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers in critical industries. Common usage of the term also 
refers to the virtual environment of information and interactions between people.”
190
 
1.2.1. Security Agenda 
The cyber sector does not offer a univocal discourse dominated by a single ideological 
position (as is the case in the economic sector). Rather, it has been argued that it is 
characterized by multiple discourses and competing articulations of constellations of linked 
(rather than discrete) referent objects within and across geographical and political 
boundaries:191 
“[p]rivacy advocates and cyberlibertarians point to governmental violations of 
personal security [. . .], and authoritarian (and not so authoritarian) regimes securitize 
transborder information flows as threats to regime/state security and national 
(societal) identity.”192 
In the following section it is argued that this multi-discursivity can be explained by different 
ideological positions that are (more or less) equally in play with each other. This seems 
familiar from the economic sector, where the mercantilist, liberal and socialist doctrines 
were identified as the most defining ideological views, with each stressing its own specific 
security agenda. However, while the economic sector is mostly dominated by a liberal 
agenda, it is not fully clear yet what agenda will dominate the cyber sector. The following 
section can therefore only provide a rough and very theoretical overview. 
1.2.1.1. Structuring Cyber Discourse 
Drawing on Milton Mueller, one can identify four pure forms of ideological positions within 
the cyber sector: cyberconservatism/-reactionaries, networked nationalism, global 
governmentality and denationalized liberalism.
193
 The main differences between them are 
their answers to questions about whether state sovereignty and societies or the free (cross-
border) interplay of networks and information should have priority, and whether self-
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organized social aggregates have security claims of their own that must be weighed against 
the malpractices within cyberspace. 
Each of these ideologies can be located in one of the four quadrants partitioned by two 
mutually perpendicular axes, both representing a particular spectrum between two 
extremes. The first axis describes “the status of the territorial nation-state”
194
 and can range 
from nation-state dominance (with state actors setting the basic political and legal frame 
around linguistic, religious and ethnic communities
195
) to transnational dominance (with 
non-state actors setting the basic institutional frame around flexible and shifting social 
aggregates). However, Mueller notes: 
“There are, of course, various spots in between these extremes: from right to left 
there are bilateral agreements and clubs among states, formal international 
organizations, multistakeholder governance arrangements, delegation private actors, 
etc.”
196
 
The second axis indicates “the level of hierarchy one is willing to countenance.”
197
 It runs 
from hierarchical governance (emerging from adherence to institutions held in place by 
coercion, calculation or belief,
198
 and enforced by an authority) towards networked 
governance (emerging from optional adherence to institutions that can be freely 
communicated, concluded and even broken). As Mueller points out: 
“Of course, between these two extremes there are many points. A base of private 
contract law can support a superstructure of more or less free networking; or we can 
recognize free networking as the primary mechanism of governance but opt for 
hierarchical intervention when network externalities convey too much power to a 
private group, or when bottlenecks form around essential facilities.”
199
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Figure 1: Structuring Cyber Discourse
200
 
Against this backdrop, the first one of the four just mentioned ideologies of the cyber sector 
is located in the lower-right quadrant. It is referred to as cyberreactionism or -conservatism 
and can be defined “as something that favours retaining the status quo, something resistant 
to change.”
201
 Here, territorial jurisdiction is given priority over the free
202
 and cross-border 
interplay of networks and information. Citizens must adhere to domestic and international 
institutions and are protected through the sovereign state, no matter whether it is 
democratic or non-democratic, authoritarian or non-authoritarian. 
In the upper-right quadrant one finds networked nationalism. Similar to cyberconservatism, 
for networked nationalists the nation-state is the dominant entity authorized to establish 
political institutions, both domestic and international. However, as opposed to 
cyberconservatism, judicial loopholes and escape valves leave enough room for networked 
actors to “escape” the basic political and legal frame. On the one hand, this allows for a 
largely free (though not necessarily cross-border) interplay of networks and information. On 
the other one, however, constantly avoiding a state’s institutions can ultimately lead to the 
erosion of its sovereignty and, consequently, of its ability to protect its citizens. Therefore, 
networked nationalism can be considered an unstable candidate for ideological longevity. 
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The lower left quadrant is occupied by global governmentality. Here, non-state jurisdiction 
allows for a cross-border interplay of networks and information. However, even though the 
social aggregates concerned must not adhere to territorial jurisdiction, they are bound to the 
political and legal frame they have chosen to be protected by. Thus, transnational 
jurisdiction is given priority over the free interplay of networks and information. Historically 
speaking, it might be difficult to imagine sufficient security capabilities centered within an 
institution other than the state. However, this does not necessarily mean that it is 
impossible. 
Lastly, denationalized liberalism (with cyberlibertarianism being its visionary precursor203) is 
about transnational actors defining the political institutions that can be freely 
communicated, concluded and even broken by flexible and shifting social aggregates. The 
free and cross-border interplay of networks and information is considered to leverage peer 
production processes regardless of any frontiers (such as peer-to-peer file sharing or email 
lists
204
). “Political institutions should seek to build upon, not undermine or reverse, the 
limitless possibilities for forming new social aggregations around global communications. [. . 
.] Governance should emerge primarily as a byproduct of many unilateral and bilateral 
decisions by its members to exchange or negotiate with other members (or to refuse to do 
so).”
205
 
1.2.1.2. Security Issues 
As should have become clear in the previous section, the discourse in the cyber sector is 
highly fragmented. Consequently, issues on the security agenda are widely scattered and 
can—as suggested by Alexander Klimburg—contain such diverse topics as cyberwarfare (e.g., 
an arms race between actors for cyber weapons of mass destruction), cybercrime/-terrorism 
(e.g., identity theft and the production of computer viruses for ideological or purely 
disruptive reasons), cyberespionage (e.g., disclosing company and government secrets), 
critical infrastructure protection (e.g., disruption of interdependent physical and virtual 
facilities that are vital to a country’s people) as well as Internet Governance (e.g., threats to 
the global domain name system).
206
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Suffice it to say that all of these issues are highly interconnected with each other. This is 
especially true for cybercrime/-terrorism and cyberespionage which often makes it difficult 
to rigorously keep them apart. 
1.2.2. Units of Analysis 
The cyber sector is comprised of a broad variety of significant referent objects. One way to 
think about them is to arrange them along distinct layers of activity. In the literature one 
finds different numbers and names of layers.
207
 However, this study argues in favor of the 
following four-level model:
208
 
1. The physical layer contains all the hardware devices which include routers, switches, 
storage media, satellites, sensors, and other technical conduits, both wired and 
wireless. The physical infrastructure can be located geographically
209
 in “real space” 
and is thus subject to different policies and jurisdictions. 
2. The logical layer generally refers to the code,
210
 which contains both the software as 
well as the protocols that can be incorporated within that software.
211
 This layer does 
not only include benign logic but also malicious one, referred to as malware which 
includes a variety of different sorts of Trojans, viruses and worms.
212
 For our context 
it is important to note that most of the Internet infrastructure (e.g., the Domain 
Name System) is concentrated on this layer. 
3. The content layer describes all the information that is created, captured, stored and 
processed within cyberspace. Inter alia, it contains all the messages that are delivered 
by social media websites or email; the content of articles and books that are stored 
on memory sticks and virtual databases; the news that are broadcasted via blogs and 
websites as well as the music, movies and pictures that are consumed online. 
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4. The social layer is made up of all the people who are using and shaping the character 
of cyberspace. It is the actual interaction of people, rather than the implied 
interaction of hardware and software. Essentially, the social layer includes 
governments as well as private sector, civil society and technical community actors. 
Mapping these four layers hierarchically into a four-tiered pyramid is not just due to 
aesthetical reasons, but it aptly highlights that the referent objects at the physical, logical, 
and content layer ultimately converge in an overall triangle: the social layer on top.
213
 
 
Figure 2: Four-Level Cyber Layer
214
 
In order to mobilize sufficient support for a securitizing move, referent objects must hold 
enough security legitimacy in terms of a claim to survival; a feature objects like 
bureaucracies, political regimes and firms rarely possess. However, by linking them to a 
higher entity’s security legitimacy (e.g., linking a firm to national economy), they potentially 
become fully securitized. In this context, it is argued that hardware devices, code and 
information can only hold a legitimate claim to survive by their direct link to the social layer. 
A quite similar argument has been brought forward by Hansen and Nissenbaum. For them, 
the security of computer networks as such is in fact a significant referent object, but it is only 
through its connection to referent objects invoking a social collectivity that it becomes 
politically important: 
“a securitization of the network cannot, and does not, stop at the network itself: it is 
the implications of network break-downs for other referent objects, ‘society,’ ‘the 
regime,’ or ‘the economy’ (which is, again, in turn linked to ‘state’ and ‘society’) that 
makes cyber securitization a plausible candidate for political and media attention.”
215
 
In this context, the two authors identify governments, private organizations, businesses and 
experts as examples of potential securitizing actors. Going a step further, one could also 
identify black and white hat hackers as well as owners of critical infrastructures as being 
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what earlier has been referred to as functional actors.216 
1.2.3. Security Grammar 
As was mentioned earlier, security grammars refer to the sector-specific constructions of a 
plot in which existential threats are tied together adequately. For the cyber sector, Hansen 
and Nissenbaum defined three distinct security grammars: hypersecuritization, everyday 
security practice, and technification.217 While all of these three security sub-forms can 
potentially be found in other security sectors as well, their prominence is particularly striking 
within the cyber sector. 
1.2.3.1. Hypersecuritization 
As opposed to Buzan, hypersecuritization in the cyber sector does not refer to “the tendency 
both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures.”
218
 Rather it is 
defined as 
“the striking manner in which cyber security discourse hinges on multi-dimensional 
cyber disaster scenarios that pack a long list of severe threats into a monumental 
cascading sequence and the fact that neither of these scenarios has so far taken 
place.”
219
 
The first part of this definition touches upon the “instantaneity and inter-locking effects”
220
 
of potential cyber attacks on a national or global network of information and communication 
technologies. The significance, however, does not arise from the network itself, but from the 
immediate and far-reaching cascading effects on the referent objects in the military, 
economic, societal and political sectors. 
The second part of the definition refers to the fact that a catastrophic cyber event has not 
yet occurred. This makes it impossible to perform an instance of securitization on the 
grounds of historic experience, as was the case during the Cold War, when the devastations 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were used as a yardstick for what nuclear war could look like. 
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Thus, lacking historic experience, securitizing actors in the cyber sector often use historic 
analogies of disasters such as the “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” 
Additionally, it is often difficult to visualize potential cyber threats or communicate them to a 
wider public. As for the environmental sector, one can imagine the devastating effects of 
acid rain, the extinction of numerous animal and plant species as well as melting polar 
icecaps and glaciers. But the lack of experience in the cyber sector makes it difficult for a 
securitizing actor to mobilize a wider audience to support his securitizing move. 
1.2.3.2. Everyday Security Practice 
The second modality in the security grammar within the cyber sector refers to everyday 
security practice which “points to the way in which securitizing actors, including private 
organizations and businesses, mobilize ‘normal’ individuals’ experiences”
221
 to get their 
message through. In order to make hypersecuritization scenarios more plausible for the 
wider public, the securitizing actor needs to link them to experiences familiar from everyday 
life. By directly referring to individual dangers such as credit card fraud, identity theft, and 
email spamming, the securitizing actor can raise the awareness of his relevant audience. 
Moreover, since the networks of information and communication technologies are 
ultimately made up by individual actors, the securitizing actor also needs to ensure that the 
individual acts as a partner and complies in protecting network security. Similar to the 
discourse of epidemics and contagion, individuals in the cyber sector are often urged to 
behave responsibly in order to not endanger the “health” of the whole. 
1.2.3.3. Technification 
The third security modality considers technification. To successfully securitize an issue, the 
securitizing actor can draw on scientific argument which gives his move additional authority. 
Through claiming “objectivity” he clearly distinguishes himself from the “politicking” of 
politicians. In that way, technifications 
“construct an issue as reliant upon technical, expert knowledge, but they also 
simultaneously presuppose a politically and normatively neutral agenda that 
technology serves.”222 
Technification can also serve to prevent an issue from being/becoming subject to a wider 
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public. By constructing it as primarily technical—requiring expertise that the public and most 
politicians do not have—underlying intentions can be hidden behind scientific “objectivity” 
and easily kept/taken out of any public discourse.  
Technifications can also be found in other sectors such as the environmental sector, where 
technifications deal with the scientific reliability of predictions about global warming, 
resource depletion, and population growth. Yet, while the audience in the environmental 
sector “is expected to know more and the repeated contestation of environmental 
‘evidence’ makes for a public view of (some) environmental actors as political ones rather 
than apolitical, ‘objective’ experts,”223 in the cyber sector “the knowledge required to master 
the field of computer security is daunting and often not available to the broader public.”
224
 
This hampers public discourse and empowers those who have the necessary knowledge to 
substantially influence the discourse (in their own interest). 
1.3. Synthesis 
As promised at the outset of this part, this synthesis shall provide a quick overview of the 
Copenhagen school’s security sectors that were just mentioned; each with its specific 
security agenda, units of analysis and sub-forms or grammars of security. 
 Security Agenda Units of Analysis Sub-Forms of Security 
Military Sector  Mainly about the 
instruments of force a state 
has at its disposal. However, 
one has to distinguish 
between an internal 
dimension (ability of the 
ruling elite to maintain civil 
order and peace), and an 
external dimension (how 
states equip themselves and 
how this is perceived by 
other states). 
 Internally, issues on the 
agenda might include 
militant separatists, rebels, 
terrorists and other actors 
opposed to the respective 
 Referent objects can be 
states (as single holders of 
military power), would-be 
states (claiming a status as 
actors at the unit level), and 
actors at the subsystem or 
system level (e.g., WEU/EU, 
NATO). 
 Securitizing actors can be 
state representatives and 
other officials, the United 
Nations General Secretary, 
intelligence services, mafias, 
gangs, clans, tribes or 
rebels. 
 Functional actors can be 
 The plot is mainly 
focused on sovereignty and 
has traditionally been 
constructed around military 
force (e.g., the opponent’s 
army), geography (e.g., 
closeness and terrain), 
history (e.g., past 
experiences and present 
perceptions) and politics 
(e.g., contradicting 
ideologies, recognition and 
status). 
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state authority. Externally, 
issues might include the 
state’s territorial integrity 
towards other actors. 
different agencies of force 
(e.g., assassins, mercenary 
companies, armies, defense 
bureaucracies, the arms 
industry, or federal 
ministries). 
Environmental Sector  Difference between the 
scientific agenda (about 
defining a reliable set of 
issues) and the political 
agenda (about addressing 
the issues already set out in 
the scientific agenda by 
raising awareness, taking 
political responsibility, and 
managing them politically). 
 Issues on the scientific 
agenda include the 
disruption of ecosystems 
and civil strife as well as 
energy, population, food, 
and economic problems. 
 The ultimate referent 
object is not nature itself, 
but human enterprise that 
would perish without it. 
 Securitizing actors can be 
divided in lead actors (such 
as states and NGOs like 
Greenpeace and the World 
Wildlife Fund), support 
actors (especially most parts 
of the developing world), 
veto actors (such as 
emerging economies and 
parts of industries), and 
veto coalitions (such as the 
US-based Global Climate 
Coalition). 
 Functional actors can be 
economic actors (such as 
transnational corporations, 
state firms, agricultural, 
chemical, and nuclear 
industries, fishing, mining 
etc.), governments and 
Intergovernmental 
organizations (such as the 
United Nations 
Environmental Program or 
the Food and Agriculture 
Organization). 
 The plot is mainly 
focused on sustainability 
and constructed around 
nature-caused threats (e.g., 
earthquakes), human-
caused threats that seem to 
cause existential damage to 
civilization (e.g., CFCs), and 
human-caused threats that 
do not seem to cause 
existential damage to 
civilization (e.g., the 
depletion of minerals that 
can be replaced by 
alternative substances, such 
as copper by silicon, or 
metal by ceramics). 
Economic Sector  Mainly shaped by the 
liberal agenda (less by the 
mercantilist or socialist 
agenda). 
 Issues on the (liberal) 
agenda include the ability of 
states to sustain military 
capabilities independently 
from the global market, the 
economic dependence of 
states on foreign (scarce) 
 Referent objects can 
include individuals, classes, 
states, firms, and the liberal 
international economic 
order. The most important 
ones, however, are firms 
that search protection from 
states and the liberal 
economic order. 
 Securitizing actors are 
found on two different 
 The plot has traditionally 
been focused on the 
sovereign economy and can 
be constructed around 
individuals (e.g., basic 
human needs), firms (e.g., 
risks of boycotts and risks of 
investment), or states (e.g., 
state bankruptcy).  
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resources, the worries that 
the global market would 
generate inequalities, the 
illegal trade in drugs and 
weapons (especially those 
of mass destruction), and 
the fears that systematic 
crisis could trigger 
government intervention. 
levels: At the local level 
(e.g., individuals, trade 
unions, city governments, or 
local political 
representatives), and at the 
national level (e.g., trade 
unions and the state 
government). 
 Functional actors are 
firms as well as 
governments and 
Intergovernmental 
organizations (such as the 
World Trade Organization 
or the World Bank). 
Societal Sector  Agenda are dependent 
upon self-defined identity 
groups which can vary 
severely through time and 
place. 
 The issues on most 
agenda, however, include 
migration, horizontal 
identity competition, and 
vertical identity 
competition. 
 The ultimate referent 
object is the collective 
identity (or “we” feeling) of 
a certain group (e.g., a clan, 
a tribe, a region, a religion a 
race or a nation). 
 There is a broad variety 
of securitizing actors 
including both official and 
semiofficial leaders claiming 
to speak on behalf of a 
certain group. 
 By framing the “us” and 
the “them”, the media can 
influence dynamics as the 
functional actor. 
 The plot is mainly 
focused on identity and can 
be constructed in manifold 
ways. 
Political Sector  Mainly about ensuring 
organizational stability. 
However, one has to 
distinguish between an 
internal dimension 
(recognition from within), 
and an external dimension 
(recognition from without). 
 Internally, issues might 
include the constitutive 
ideas defining a political 
unit or pattern. Externally, 
issues might include the 
recognition or non-
recognition of political units 
 The territorial state can 
be a referent object as well 
as quasi-superstates (e.g., 
the EU), self-organized, but 
stateless societal groups 
with strong institutions 
(e.g., tribes or minorities), 
and transnational 
movements (e.g., the 
Catholic Church, the 
Muslims or the 
communists). 
 Securitizing actors are 
comparatively well defined 
here and include the 
 The plot is mainly 
focused on sovereignty and 
has traditionally been built 
around the idea of the state 
(e.g., democracy, capitalism 
or communism), its 
governing institutions (e.g., 
the legislative, 
administrative and judicial 
bodies, and laws), and the 
physical base at its disposal 
(such as population and 
territory). 
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and pattern. institutionally authorized 
leaders who can speak 
security. 
 Functional actors include 
the media as well as 
governments and (I)NGOs. 
 
Additionally to the five classical security sectors, the following table shall give an overview of 
the details discussed in the cyber section. 
 
 Security Agenda Units of Analysis Security Grammar 
Cyber Sector  There is no single agenda 
in the cyber sector. Rather, 
it is characterized by 
multiple discourses, 
including denationalized 
liberalism, networked 
nationalism, global 
governmentality and 
cyberreactinaries. 
 Taken together, issues on 
the different agenda can 
include cyberwarfare, 
cybercrime/-terrorism, 
cyberespionage, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP) and Information 
Assurance (IA) as well as 
Internet Governance. 
 The analytical 
significance of referent 
objects at the physical, 
logical and informational 
cyber layers (e.g., 
confidentiality, integrity and 
availability, CIA) only arises 
from their connection to the 
social top layer which refers 
to all possible levels of 
security analysis (micro, 
middle and macro levels). 
 Securitizing actors 
include governments, 
private organizations, 
businesses and experts. 
 Functional actors can 
include (both black and 
white hat) hackers, 
Intelligence communities, 
owners of critical 
infrastructures, Internet 
Service Provider,… 
 The plot is mainly 
constructed around 
multidimensional cascading 
disasters (e.g., the 
opponent’s army), everyday 
security practice (e.g., 
closeness and terrain), and 
technical and expert 
knowledge (e.g., 
contradicting ideologies, 
recognition and status). 
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2. Internet Governance 
2.1. Internet Governance and the Copenhagen Cchool 
In the previous part, Internet governance has been identified as an issue area within the 
wider cyber agenda. However, before we can move on and investigate area specific instances 
of securitization,
225
 we first need to set the characteristic scene in which the securitizing 
actor can feasibly apply the sector-specific sub-form or grammar of security.
226
 Consequently, 
the primary task of the following sections is to identify a critical element of the Internet 
whose breakdown could possibly have important implications for one or more social layer 
referent objects.
227
 In doing so, we will also pay due attention to the historic processes that 
finally led to the creation of the Internet as we know it today. Moreover, we will provide an 
understanding of the main political constellation in Internet governance. Finally, we offer a 
set of possible securitizing actors228 with the capabilities229 to potentially succeed in an 
attempted securitization.  
2.1.1. The Internet 
Cyberspace has been characterized as the world behind your screen. However, when 
computers were enabled to talk to each other, that world started to expand. The Internet (or 
Net) has played a decisive, yet not exclusive role for the expansion of cyberspace. Referring 
to the previous part, the Internet is mainly located at the logical cyber layer. By using a 
combination of different data transmission mechanisms—such as the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP) as the two most important protocols within the 
Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP)—an increasing number of Internet users (defined as persons 
who have available access to an Internet connection point,
230
 and the basic knowledge 
required to use web technology
231
) was empowered by receiving unprecedented access to 
information. Especially over the last 16 years, the total number of Internet users has risen 
                                                      
225
 Defined as an inter-subjective process by which a powerful actor discursively constructs an issue as a threat 
to a specific referent object. 
226
 In the case of the cyber sector, the sub-form of security is mainly focused on 
integrity/availability/confidentiality and constructed around multidimensional cascading disasters, everyday 
security practice, technical and expert knowledge as well as metaphors. 
227
 Referred to as things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survive. 
The referent object is that to which one can point and say, “It has to survive, therefore it is necessary to….” 
228
 Defined as actors who securitize issues by declaring something—a referent object—existentially threatened; 
someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, 
bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups. 
229
 Including both Waltzian material capabilities as well as Bourdieuan socio-cultural capabilities. 
230
 Internet connection points are usually provided by Internet service providers (ISPs) against payment. 
231
 See Internet World Stats, Surfing and Site Guide, 2011, http://www.internetworldstats.com/surfing.htm#1. 
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from 16 million in 1995 to more than 2.1 billion in 2011.232 This is an outstanding increase of 
+13,000%. 
While the Internet was largely an American creation,
233
 today most Internet users come from 
other parts of the world. In 2011, 44% came from Asia, 22.7% from Europe, and only 13% 
from North America.
234
 In this context, the Internet has been defined as 
“the global data communication capability realized by the interconnection of public 
and private telecommunication networks using Internet Protocol (IP), Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP), and the other protocols required to implement IP 
internetworking on a global scale, such as DNS and packet routing protocols.”
235
 
The strong technical emphasize of this definition will be more accessible after looking in 
more depth at the history of the Internet. However, prior to that it is important to point at 
the basic difference between generic computer networks and the Internet as the one and 
only network of networks with a global reach. 
2.1.1.1. The Internet as the Global Network of Computer Networks  
Most basically, an internetwork, or simply internet (with a lowercase “i”), is established by 
interconnecting computer networks through routers, switches, satellites, sensors, and other 
conduits, both wired and wireless. These generic networks of networks can vary in scale. One 
of the smallest networks is the personal area network (PAN). In essence, a PAN is a network 
that does not exceed the scale of a conventional desk or office and that only covers small 
computers and devices (such as a notebook, a printer and a PDA236). However, if PANs are 
connected with other PANs within areas such as office buildings, universities or power 
plants, one usually speaks about local area networks (LANs). Moreover, if the level of 
interconnection exceeds the size of a LAN in that it covers a terrain such as a city or a state, 
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one can speak about wide area networks (WANs). 
By contrast, the Internet (with an uppercase “I”) can be described as the worldwide 
collection of all existing PANs, LANs and WANs. It is the unique “global network of computer 
networks,”
237
 the one and only network of networks that concerns the total collective Self of 
all Internet users on a planetary (or even “intergalactic”
238
) scale. 
2.1.1.2. Decisive Moments in Internet History  
After having characterized the Internet as the global network of computer networks, we are 
now ready to look in more depth at its history. By sketching the Internet’s gradual 
development, we will not only try to provide some basic technical explanations, but also pay 
due attention to the political constellations and processes that accompanied the progressive 
advancement of the Net. 
2.1.1.2.1. From Sputnik to ARPA 
The Internet was not created in one single unexpected “Eureka!” moment, but evolved over 
time. If one wanted to finger point at a specific event that triggered this evolution, he can 
safely be referred to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik 1 on 4 October 1957. With the size 
of a basketball, Sputnik was the world’s first ever seen earth-orbiting satellite, capable only 
of relaying radio signals back to earth.
239
 From today’s perspective, this does not sound 
particularly alarming. However, the language of reaction that was eventually employed by 
the US press created a general atmosphere of hysteria and self-doubt.
240
 Thus, without 
posing an objectively identifiable (“real”) threat, Sputnik nevertheless prompted the 
employment of radical measures that were far beyond the adoption of conventional policy 
approaches. 
Most importantly, Sputnik facilitated a shift from traditional to modern-day US science 
policy.
241
 This meant an increased budget for advanced research and development (R&D) as 
well as organizational changes. Probably one of the utmost important organizational 
innovations included the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), a 
federal body located in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and with the central control 
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over advanced science and technology.242 In 1972 the agency was renamed into Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
243
 
As a relatively small and independent organization with a lean and non-bureaucratic 
structure, ARPA “was designed to be an agent for change in the Department of Defense.”
244
 
It was not only authorized to direct R&D projects within the DoD, but also to work in relation 
with other government agencies, and “to enter into contracts and agreements with 
individuals, private business entities, educational, research or scientific institutions including 
federal or state institutions.”
245
 In its role as an “instigator of radical innovation,” ARPA 
committed itself to a multi-disciplinary “high-risk—high-payoff” agenda that should “Create 
surprise”, “Build communities of ‘change-state advocates’”, as well as “Define challenges, 
develop solution concepts, and demonstrate them.”
246
  
Originally, ARPA focused on three key areas: space, missile defense, and nuclear-test 
detection. However, after the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
became operational in October 1958, ARPA’s aerospace competences and large parts of its 
budget were transferred over to NASA.
247
 Nonetheless, as the Defense Department’s 
premiere research arm, ARPA was soon assigned responsibility for alternative military and 
non-military research areas. Among others, these included the engagement in building 
weapons as well as the development of advanced computers and communications for the 
DoD’s command and control systems. While the initial aim of the previous (and less 
successful) task was to help South Vietnamese troops to defend themselves against the 
North and Viet Cong guerillas, the latter one was the actual facilitator for what is now known 
as the Internet.248 
2.1.1.2.2. ARPANET and Packet-Switching 
During the 1960s and 70s, ARPA’s engineers gave birth to ARPANET, a distributed computer 
network that used packet-switching technology to make computers speak with each other. 
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One of the biggest advantages of packet switching is that a line between two communicating 
nodes can be used by third users as well. While in traditional telephony (using circuit-
switching technology) the engaged line between two interconnected subscribers cannot be 
used to carry other calls at the same time (even if the subscribers remain silent), in packet-
switching systems there is no need for a permanent pathway between the subscribers. This 
is made possible only because everything that can effectively be digitized (or translated into 
zeros and ones) is cut into data packets with an average size of 512 bytes. In order to use 
communications channels effectively, these chunks of information can subsequently be 
transmitted simultaneously across a variety of different circuits. Once the packets have 
arrived at their intended destination (no matter in what sequence) the respective data 
packets can be reassembled.
249
 For the first time, this technology was tested in 1969, when 
the Universities of California (UCLA) and Stanford (SRI)—the first two nodes of ARPANET—
exchanged their first host-to-host message.
250
 
2.1.1.2.3. Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
After making computers speak with each other within their respective networks, one of the 
following steps was to find a way how these relatively heterogeneous computer networks 
could speak with each other too. The underlying problem was that networks were relatively 
autonomous in that they used their own distinct communication conventions or network 
protocols
251
 to interconnect their respective computers. Therefore, the aim was to find a 
protocol that would recognize and support heterogeneity between different networks. The 
protocol that made that possible was the so called Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), 
which was first tested in 1977 when ARPANET was successfully connected with a radio and a 
satellite network.
252
  
Soon, TCP was supplemented by the so called Internet Protocol (IP), which is essentially 
responsible for passing packets from one node to another. This process of passing and 
delivering packets can only be successfully implemented if the attached IP addresses are 
unique across the Internet. An IP address is a complex string of values that identifies the 
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physical location of a computer that is connected to the Internet (e.g., PCs, servers, 
smartphones). In this way, an IP address is the binary equivalent to license plate numbers 
which uniquely identify any form of vehicle in the streets. In the early 1980s, a total number 
of 4.3 billion (4.3x10^9) IP addresses (referred to as IPv4)
253
 was considered to be enough for 
the foreseeable future.254 However, the explosive demand for IP address blocks over the last 
thirty years, as well as the vision of an Internet of Things (IoT)—where everyday objects (such 
as home appliances or clothing) are made accessible over the Internet—have proven that the 
original quantity of IP addresses was inadequate. This is why, in the 1990s IP version 6 
(referred to as IPv6)
255
 had been developed. IPv6 would provide enough addresses space for 
around 340 undecillion (3.4x10^38) Internet connection points. With an estimated world 
population of 6.8 billion living human beings,
256
 the potential number of IPv6 addresses 
would enable each individual to connect around 1.2 billion devices to the Net; or, 
metaphorically speaking: “if all the IPv4 addresses could fit within a Blackberry, it would take 
something the size of Earth to contain IPv6.”
257
 
TCP/IP lies at the core of today’s Internet. But, in fact, there are far more protocols that 
directly depend upon TCP/IP. Instead of using a single universal protocol to handle all 
transmission tasks, a set of cooperating protocols has been (and still is being) developed. 
Altogether, these network protocols can be segmented by their function along the four layer 
stack of the so called Internet Protocol Suite,
258
 which is—due to the importance of its two 
central protocols—also known as TCP/IP.
259
 Referring to the four-layer model of cyberspace 
that was set out in the units of analysis section of the previous part, the TCP/IP protocol 
stake can be located on the logical (or code) cyber layer containing both the software as well 
as the protocols that can be incorporated within that software. 
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2.1.1.2.4. The Global Domain Name System (DNS) 
Building upon TCP/IP, one of the most critical elements of the Internet is its Domain Name 
System (DNS). The DNS is a global addressing system that—through a process called DNS 
resolution—converts unique machine-readable IP addresses into human-readable domain 
names (e.g., wikipedia.org). Typically, domain names are used to make content accessible 
through Internet services such as email or the World Wide Web (WWW). Today, almost all 
Internet activity relies upon a properly functioning DNS. If, for some reason, DNS resolution 
cannot be ensured, any Internet service will be affected. In this way, a breakdown of the DNS 
can potentially have significant implications for social layer referent objects such as 
“society,” “the regime,” or “the economy” (which is, again, in turn linked to “state” and 
“society”). 
When the DNS was created in the 1980s, a single database file called “hosts.txt” was 
sufficiently enough to map host names to their respective IP addresses.260 However, 
especially after Mosaic—the first major graphics supporting browser—was released in 1993, 
the amount of Web content started to increase exponentially. In August 1995 there were 
around 18,000 Websites (including sub pages) with domain names and content on the 
Net,261 compared to more than 463 million in August 2011.262 This is a total increase of more 
than 2.5 million percent over the last 16 years; even though a significant share of this 
increase was only generated over the last two years.
263
 
Due to the growing number of Web content it soon became clear that storing domain names 
and corresponding IP addresses in one all-encompassing directory was not feasibly 
manageable. Consequently, the global DNS directory was hierarchically distributed over 
different name server levels, with 13 root server locations on top (10 in the US, and one each 
in Japan, Holland and Sweden),
264
 a considerable contingent of top-level domain (TLD) 
servers underneath, and a large number of authoritative DNS servers at the very bottom 
end.265 
The hierarchic apex of the DNS is the root zone file which is published by the 13 root server 
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locations. However, instead of listing all existing server locations in the world, the root zone 
file only contains information about the TLD servers immediately below it. This means that 
the authority of the TLD zone only lies with the operator of the respective TLD servers. Once 
a higher name server level delegates authority for a subordinate zone (or namespace) to a 
lower level, this lower level has sole responsibility over the zone. 
 
Figure 3: DNS Hierarchy
266
 
Reading from right to left, this hierarchic organization is reflected in domain names, where 
dots separate higher level domains at the right side from lower level domains at the left (see 
graph). In domain names, the root is basically displayed at the rightmost end. In a 
conventional Web browser, however, the root is usually invisible and separated by an 
equally invisible dot from the rest of the domain name (de.wikipedia.org” ”).  
The (visible) top end of domain names is referred to as top-level domain or TLD 
(de.wikipedia.”org”). Currently, there are 312 different TLDs.
267
 Most prominently, these can 
be segmented into generic TLDs or gTLDs (such as “org”, “com” or “info”) and country 
code
268 TLDs or ccTLDs (such as “at”, “tv” or “to”). Also, this number includes both a small 
contingent of different TLDs that are exclusively reserved for the US (such as “gov”, “mil” or 
“edu”) and couple of Internationalized Domain Names or IDNs that have recently been 
introduced to the DNS (such as “рф“ for Russia).
269
 Due to a continuing expansion of 
Internationalized Domain Names or IDNs (such as the upcoming introduction of “ελ” for 
Greece) and an expected rollout estimate of 315-40 new gTLDs per year
270
 (such as “radio”, 
“car” or “gay”), the current number of TLDs can soon be expected to increase.
271
 
Typically, the lower a domain name is located within the DNS hierarchy, the closer it is to the 
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individual end-user machine. In our example, the second-level domain (de.”wikipedia”.org) 
referred to an organization, the third-level domain (“de”.wikipedia.org) indicated the 
language in which this organization provides Web content. However, even though second 
level domains often stand for the name or type of a specific institution, this classification 
does not always hold true and can vary significantly (e.g., in “sex”.com, “beer”.com or 
“business”.com).
272
 
The logic of a hierarchical distributed DNS can best be described by looking at a very 
simplified example (see graph). For instance, if someone—everything else being equal—
wanted to access a website on the Internet (e.g., google.com), his computer would first need 
to query one of the 13 root server location on top about where to find the relevant TLD 
server (in this case the “com” server). With this information, the particular TLD server can be 
located and eventually queried about how to find the DNS server hosting the desired Web 
site (in this case the “google” server). If, in this very simplified example, the information in 
the root zone file is suddenly not available anymore, DNS queries would not be resolved 
sufficiently and the Web site could not be accessed. 
 
Figure 4: How does the DNS work?
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However, to give this example a more realistic flavor, root servers are usually not queried 
every time anew. In most cases the lower level servers will memorize or cache the location of 
previously searched sites and can directly provide the information needed. As Karrenberg 
puts it: 
“A well behaved DNS server needs to query the root name servers only once every 48 
hours for each particular TLD. In the meantime it can resolve names for that TLD 
without involvement of the root name servers. Because of this caching almost all DNS 
queries are answered without involvement of the root name servers.”
274
 
One of the biggest advantages of DNS caching is not only the increased query performance 
achieved by bypassing root servers, but also the redundancy it adds to the DNS. If queries 
can be resolved (more or less) independently from the root servers, the Internet keeps 
working even if all 13 root server locations simultaneously disappear. 
 
Figure 5: Root Name Server Locations
275
 
A similar effect is achieved by virtually adding more root server locations to the DNS. 
Increasing the number of root server locations not only allows for better redundancy, but 
also for closer proximity, which potentially leads to a quicker response to the users’ query. 
Increasing the total number of root server locations would also make it necessary to equally 
increase the corresponding number of IP addresses. For technical reasons, however, this is 
not possible.
276
 Therefore, a technology called anycast was developed. Without equally 
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increasing the total number of 13 IP addresses, anycast allowed for additional server 
locations all across the world. Today, 9 root server operators make use of anycast which is 
why, as of June 2011, root servers were operated in more than 239 locations in 69 
countries—most of them outside the US (see map).
277
 
2.1.1.3. Do DNS Disruptions have any Relevance for the Social Layer? 
Due to the fact that today almost all Internet activity relies upon properly functioning DNS 
resolution, in the previous section it has been argued that a breakdown of the DNS can 
possibly lead to significant implications for social layer referent objects. To look at this 
argument in more depth, the following section will discuss an (attempted) national-level 
politicization
278
 of DNS risks that was conducted by the US Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).
279
 
 
Figure 6: Undesired Consequences for the National DNS Infrastructure
280
 
In its 2009 Information Technology Sector Baseline Risk Assessment (ITSBRA),
281
 the DHS 
together with participating subject-matter experts evaluated national-level risks across six 
critical IT sector functions,
282
 with the provision of DNS resolution being one of them.
283
 In an 
attempt to engage all relevant public and private actors in national risk management, the 
ITSBRA intended to serve as a “foundation for ongoing national-level collaboration to 
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enhance the security and resiliency of the critical IT Sector functions.”284 As regards the 
provision of DNS resolution, the report distinguished between four “undesired 
consequences” that could potentially have a negative effect on the national DNS 
infrastructure (see graph). 
1. Policy, governance and knowledge failures refer to the fragmentation of the single 
interoperable and global Internet into disconnected, separate root systems. Policy 
failures can be caused for various reasons. The report identifies four principal 
objectives: 
a. politically-motivated attempts to influence or disrupt DNS operations, 
b. desire for financial gain, 
c. demonstration of technical superiority, and 
d. gratuitous defacement or damage.
285
 
Once the Internet is fragmented, the resultant lack of interoperability between 
alternate root systems as well as technical confusion over different standards can 
have “significant economic and national security impacts to the DNS critical function, 
and [. . .] could result in political and diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and 
nation-state threat actors.”286 Policy approaches to mitigate these economic and 
political implications can include further implementation of IDNs, increasing 
information sharing to build confidence and awareness across the DNS community or 
conducting exercises to test DNS services. 
2. Information Disclosure and Privacy Loss can be caused by mismanagement of cached 
data files (e.g., through USB drives), bad code (e.g., software vulnerabilities), phishing 
attacks (e.g., acquiring passwords for bank accounts), insecure wireless networks 
(e.g., in hotels). There can be various reasons for information disclosure and privacy 
loss. However, often they are politically or economically motivated. Policy 
approaches to mitigate risks can include education and training as well as adopting 
standards and best practices. 
3. Loss and Denial of Service can be caused by attacks against DNS infrastructure (e.g., 
against root servers), inadequately implemented new technologies (e.g., IPv6 or 
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DNSSEC287) or bad code (e.g., software vulnerabilities). Such attacks “could include 
denial or loss of service of electronic education and tracking systems, supply chain 
issues, disrupted or degraded electronic banking, shipment tracking, and Voice-over-
Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies, and credit trading.”
288
 Policy approaches to 
mitigate these implications can include diplomatic and law enforcement responses or 
improving emergency communications. 
4. Data and Service Corruption can be caused by man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping 
attacks against high-access system administrators of name servers as well as by 
(malicious) data injection through hacked user accounts or social engineering attacks. 
By coercing, co-opting or convincing
289
 “an employee, the attack could be as simple 
as shutting down specific network hardware or software components.”
290
 
In fact, there was no obvious media scrutiny on ITSBRA in the US. However, the collaboration 
of all relevant public and private actors in the report’s preparatory process generated 
enough debate and policy approaches that one can indeed speak of an (at least attempted) 
politicization of DNS risks posing an (economic and political) threat to the state as the 
legitimate social layer referent object. Therefore, to conclude this section, we can maintain 
our argument that a breakdown of the DNS can potentially have significant implications for 
social layer referent objects such as “society,” “the regime,” or “the economy” (which is, 
again, in turn linked to “state” and “society”). 
2.1.2. Internet Governance 
Discussions related to Internet governance issues date at least back to the early 1990s, when 
the Harvard Information Infrastructure Project (HIIP)291 drew together experts from 
government, industry, and academia, to elaborate on emerging policy issues related to the 
development, use and growth of the global information infrastructure (most notably the 
Internet).
292
 The HIIP was intended to serve as an interdisciplinary forum for economists, 
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lawyers, political scientists and technologists, and culminated in a series of different 
publications. Their basic assumption was that the Internet had an unprecedented impact on 
our existing world order. As HIIP key researcher Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson put it: 
“Our experience of geographic space has been transformed by the information 
revolution, as it was by the railroad and air travel. But the transformation now 
underway on the Internet is not only greater and qualitatively different. It has 
collapsed the world, transcending and blurring political boundaries in the process. It 
gives individuals instant, affordable access to other individuals, wherever they may 
be, and it enables each to publish to the world.”293 
However, transcending national borders does not simultaneously imply the dissolution of the 
state. With physical power over people and infrastructure, states will remain important 
actors. However, what will change is the way how this power is exercised. In an environment 
where the (trans-border) interaction between people can hardly be confined to the sole 
jurisdiction of a single state actor, overlapping responsibilities will make it necessary for 
governments to collaborate with private sector and civil society actors.
294
 
In the course of the 1990s, the rather academic debates over Internet governance reached a 
broader public. When it became clear that the global DNS was not only a single point of 
technical failure, but also a single point for policy decisions about surveillance and control of 
access to cyberspace, questions about the difference between technical management on the 
one hand, and regulatory control on the other were posed. For instance, was the decision to 
enter a TLD into the root zone file a mere technical issue or is it a public policy issue? For 
Milton Mueller, “[t]he uncomfortable fact is that the two meanings of ‘Internet governance’ 
are inseparably linked.”295 
Increasingly, state actors became aware of the fact that they did not really understand the 
concrete subject matter of Internet governance. Therefore, in the final document to the 
2003 United Nation’s (UN) World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS-I),
296
 “the 
representatives of the peoples of the world”
297
 called for setting up a collaborative Working 
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Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). The WGIG should be composed of states as well as 
the private sector and civil society actors. It had the aim to “investigate and make proposals 
for action, as appropriate, on the governance of [the] Internet by 2005.”
298
 After four 
meetings and with full and active participation of multiple stakeholders—including 
governments (44%), the private sector (28%) and non-governmental actors (28%)299 from 
both developing (59%) and developed countries (41%)
300
—the WGIG delivered a report
301
 
(and an accompanying background report
302
) that served as an input for the 2005 WSIS in 
Tunis (WSIS-II).
303
 The main recommendation of the WGIG was the creation of a forum that 
“could address [. . .] issues, that are cross-cutting and multidimensional and that 
either affect more than one institution, are not dealt with by any institution, or are 
not addressed in a coordinated manner.”
304
 
This recommendation fundamentally inspired WSIS-II and led to the creation of a multi-
stakeholder Internet Governance Forum (IGF) which should “identify emerging issues, bring 
them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the general public, and, where appropriate, 
make recommendations.”
305
 
However, WGIG did not only recommend the creation of an Internet-related forum, but also 
provided a working definition of Internet governance that was eventually adopted by WSIS-II. 
By clearly reflecting the multi-stakeholder spirit behind WGIG and the IGF the definition 
reads as follows: 
“Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the 
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private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, 
rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use 
of the Internet.”
306
 
This definition is intentionally broad in scope and touches upon a myriad of different issue 
areas
307
 and actors. This is also why, in Internet governance, one cannot speak of one single 
Internet governance regime, but of multiple regimes (including the DNS regime, intellectual 
property regime, etc.).
308
 
2.1.2.1. Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration 
Multi-stakeholder collaboration is the main mode of Internet governance. It is the basic 
pattern or political constellation of interaction. Freedman provided the following definition: 
“A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.”
309
 
While the term “stakeholder” only refers to one actor, the expression “multi-stakeholder” 
refers to at least two of them. Most recently, multi-stakeholder collaboration has been 
defined as follows: 
“The development and implementation of Internet governance arrangements should 
ensure, in an open, transparent and accountable manner, the full participation of 
governments, the private sector, civil society and the technical community, taking 
into account their specific roles and responsibilities. The development of 
international Internet-related public policies and Internet governance arrangements 
should enable full and equal participation of all countries.”
310
 
The concept of multi-stakeholder collaboration is still in its infancy. To provide a better 
understanding, we refer to the next section that comprehensively tries to describe probably 
one of the most prominent examples of multi-stakeholder corporation: the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
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2.1.3. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
After having identified the DNS worth to be linked to a social layer referent object, and multi-
stakeholder collaboration as the most characteristic political constellation in Internet 
governance, we can now move on and uncover a set of potential securitizing actors that are 
relevant in context of the overall coordination of the global DNS. 
Securitizing actors have been defined as those actors who have enough capabilities
311
 to 
potentially succeed in declaring something—a referent object—as existentially threatened; 
someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. In context of the overall 
coordination of the global DNS, all relevant stakeholders are concentrated in one multi-
stakeholder organization called Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN). 
ICANN is a private-sector nonprofit public benefit corporation organized under the California 
Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law (NPBCL).312 As one of the few globally centralized 
points of control and surveillance over the Internet, ICANN is “the main Internet governance 
institution.”
313
 To ensure “the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifier 
systems,”
314
 ICANN does essentially three things: 
1. coordinate the allocation and assignment of domain names, IP addresses, 
autonomous system numbers (ASNs)
315
 as well as protocol and parameter 
numbers;
316
 
2. coordinate the operation and evolution of the DNS root name server system; and 
3. coordinate policy development reasonably and appropriately related to these 
technical functions.
317
 
The strong emphasize on “technical coordination”
318
 obfuscates ICANN’s public policy 
functions. In this respect, it is crucial to note that ICANN not only serves a technical function, 
but also plays a regulatory role.
319
 Allocating and assigning domain names also implies 
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important policy decisions about the market supply of new TLDs. These can either be driven 
by trademark interests or different concerns about the appropriateness of specific TLDs. 
More recently, however, ICANN has also tried to strengthen its security role.
320
 In this way it 
increasingly started to commit itself to questions about the deployment of security measures 
in the DNS and about how to make its stakeholders comply with cost-intensive solutions. 
Consequently, the management of the DNS is not only about technical issue, but also about 
public policy issues. 
From this perspective, it is interesting why global DNS policy making is carried out by a newly 
established Californian private-sector corporation, and not—as was the case with telegraphy, 
telephony and radio communication—by a venerable intergovernmental Geneva-based 
organization such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). In fact, the choice to 
establish ICANN must be understood in context of the strong desire to liberalize US 
telecommunications after the 1984 breakdown of the AT&T monopoly. After the US had 
successfully managed to quickly change to an open-competitive market, it was feared that 
other countries, which followed a slower path of privatization (such as most countries in 
Europe), could have a negative impact on prizes in the US telecommunication market.
321
 This 
general spirit reached its peak with the publication of the Clinton administration’s 
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (FGEC), which set forth principles of private 
sector leadership and industry self-regulation.
322
 
Having emphasized US concerns about restrictions to competition as being the driving force 
behind ICANN’s creation, we can now look in more depth at the historic processes around 
ICANN’s formation. 
2.1.3.1. From Postel to ICANN 
In its early days DNS administration was solely handled by one particular person: Jon Postel, 
a computer scientist and Internet pioneer working at the University of California (UCLA).
323
 
Under contract with DARPA, Postel held exclusive policy authority over the name and 
address space and was responsible that all the assigned names and numbers were unique 
throughout the Internet. In this role, he has lovingly been referred to as a “[b]eared and 
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sandaled [. . .] resident hippie-patriarch”324 and the “‘benevolent dictator’ of the 
network.”
325
 In 1990, Postel’s function became to be known as the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA). 
However, after the World Wide Web was successfully introduced as an application on the 
Internet, the number of domain name registrations started to grow exponentially, “from 300 
per month in 1992 to 45,000 per month by late 1995.”
326
 The sudden rush for unique domain 
names during the 1990s quickly led to a legal conflict between trademark owners and Jon 
Postel as IANA, who did not sufficiently provide private property protection procedures 
against misuse and speculation with trademarked names. 
Looking for a better legal and financial framework, Postel suggested moving the IANA 
function from DARPA into the newly created private non-profit Internet Society (ISOC). This 
proposal was immediately challenged by the US government who viewed this move as “a 
privatization of the root without any formal legal authority.”
327
 But also the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and several private actors raise doubts about ISOC’s political 
legitimacy and legal authority to adequately handle the administration of the root.  
As a result, in 1996, ISOC forged ahead and pulled together its most influential critics 
(including the International Trademark Association (INTA) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO)) in an International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) that ultimately resulted in 
the creation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)328 under the ITU. In effect, the MoU 
called for the establishment of an international self-regulatory framework for the 
administration and management of the DNS. 
The newly established international framework, however, triggered governmental 
resentment. As Mueller reports: 
“In late April 1997 US Secretary of State Madeline Albright wrote a memo criticizing 
the ITU Secretariat for acting ‘without authorization of member governments’ to hold 
[. . .] ‘a global meeting involving an unauthorized expenditure of resources and 
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concluding with a quote international agreement unquote.”329 
But also the European Commission (EC) chimed in on the chorus of criticism over the MoU 
and claimed “it was ‘too US-centric’ and demanding more EC representation and ‘further 
public debate.’”
330
 Lacking the necessary recognition, the MoU was consequently taken from 
the political agenda and replaced by a US Green Paper.331 The Green Paper was submitted for 
public comment in February 1998 by the Department of Commerce (DoC) that, through the 
Presidential Directive on Electronic Commerce, has been officially authorized 
“to support efforts to make the governance of the domain name system private and 
competitive and to create a contractually based self-regulatory regime that deals with 
potential conflicts between domain name usage and trademark laws on a global 
basis.”
332
 
In this context, the Green Paper essentially suggested the establishment of a newly created 
US-based, private not-for-profit corporation that would promote international participation 
in the DNS and displace DARPA’s role as the legal home for IANA. Unsurprisingly, the Green 
Paper was mainly criticized for its US-centric orientation:333 
“The E.U. criticized U.S. dominance over the Internet and called for an international 
representative body for future Internet governance. ‘The European Union and its 
Member States would wish to emphasis [sic] our concern that the future 
management of the Internet should reflect the fact that it is already a global 
communications medium and the subject of valid international interest.”334 
In response to the public concerns about potential US government control over the new 
corporation, the US DoC made important changes that in June 1998 finally led to the release 
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of a White Paper.335 Therein, the DoC confirmed that it would 
“recognize the need for and fully support mechanisms that would ensure 
international input into the management of the domain name system. In withdrawing 
the U.S. Government from DNS management and promoting the establishment of a 
new, non-governmental entity to manage Internet names and addresses, a key U.S. 
Government objective has been to ensure that the increasingly global Internet user 
community has a voice in decisions affecting the Internet’s technical 
management.”
336
 
The DoC’s commitment to a process of self-regulation in the establishment of an 
international non-governmental DNS entity was hopefully picked up and widely taken at face 
value. This was especially true for large parts of the Internet community who were 
effectively calling for an International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP). In the time between 
June and August 1998, the IFWP included a series of open multi-stakeholder discussions, 
electronic mailing lists and workshops with participants from all around the world. In order 
“to prepare for the transition from government to private management,”
337
 the self-imposed 
aim of the forum’s participants was to draft a legal framework for the new DNS 
corporation.
338
 
Meanwhile, IANA and ISOC started a separate initiative outside the IFWP process. Although 
“IANA participated in every one of the IFWP meetings,”339 Postel, together with a corporate 
lawyer,
340
 produced his own set of draft articles and bylaws, posted them online and tried to 
incorporate the comments he received into a revised version.
341
 This procedure was similar 
to the procedures usually applied by IETF members for developing Internet standards 
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through RFCs.342 However, as Jeremy Malcolm put it, 
“[t]he IFWP participants [. . .] were not the same body of broadly like-minded 
engineers with which the IETF was accustomed to deal, and they proved not nearly so 
compliant. They rejected IANA’s invitation to use its draft bylaws as a basis for 
discussion, on the ground that it pre-empted the achievement of consensus that the 
discussion was designed to forge.”
343
 
In a final meeting that was scheduled around September 1998, the members of the IFWP 
intended to assemble their points of consensus
344
 in a set of proposals in order to submit 
them to the DoC. They invited IANA to join the meeting and to provide some final input. 
However, this time, IANA stroke back and rejected to appear. It announced that it had 
already obtained agreement on its own revised bylaws purporting to reflect the IFWP 
consensus.”
345
 But it got even worse: “IANA’s supporters on the IFWP steering committee, 
most notably Mike Roberts [one of ISOC’s founders], pushed to disband the IFWP instead of 
holding a wrap-up meeting.”346 As a result, the IFWP was dissolved. 
In October 1998, IANA submitted its proposal to the DoC in which it was calling for the 
creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
Unexpectedly, a small group of undiscouraged IFWP members returned, referring to 
themselves as the Boston Group. By putting together what they regarded to be the real 
consensus of the IFWP process, they also made a competing submission to the DoC.347 
However, in the end the DoC only recognized IANA’s proposal, notwithstanding the strong 
recommendation to consult with other groups and review the submitted proposal in order 
“to broaden the consensus.”
348
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2.1.3.2. Struggle for Legitimacy 
The widespread discontent over ICANN’s formation laid the basis for its deep-seated 
legitimacy problem. As holds Andrew Hurrell, “questions of legitimacy emerge whenever 
power is exercised in the context of competing interests and conflicting values.”349 This was 
most obvious during the history of ICANN’s formation. However, after its inception 
substantive doubts about ICANN’s legitimacy remained. While state actors (first and 
foremost the EC) criticized the US administration’s unilateral engagement during ICANN’s 
formation, IFWP members were highly dissatisfied about the dismissal of their community 
consensus. This frustration was aggravated when it became clear that many of John Postel’s 
self-selected board members were unfamiliar with technical issues concerning the Internet 
and only slowly adapted to both the community’s mores and its open approach to 
communication. 
As if this were not enough, the DoC did not keep its promise to transfer the management of 
the DNS to a new, non-governmental entity. Instead, it retained leverage over ICANN 
through a set of different contracts.
350
 Most importantly, it signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with ICANN, specifying a list of objectives for ICANN to accomplish 
before the DoC would release it from official oversight as a fully non-governmental entity. 
From 1999 to 2003 this document was amended six times and ultimately replaced by a Joint 
Project Agreement (JPA) in 2007. In essence, the JPA has been perceived as yet another 
amendment to the MoU
351
 and effectively squeezed the “outstanding” modifications to 
ICANN’s policy making in a biblical series of ten key responsibilities. In 2008, ICANN’s board 
claimed that these requirements were already met and proposed that the JPA was no longer 
necessary.
352
 In 2009, the JPA expired without being extended. Instead, the DoC and ICANN 
entered into an Affirmation of Commitment (AoC).
353
 Under the AoC, ICANN commits itself to 
“remain a not for profit corporation, headquartered in the United States of America with 
offices around the world to meet the needs of a global community”
354
 and to establish 
review panels that would regularly make recommendations. 
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A second important instrument for the US to conduct oversight over ICANN is through the 
IANA functions contract. Most importantly, these functions contain the allocation of IP 
address blocks and the editing of the root zone file. However, any changes in the root zone 
file must be approved by the DoC.
355
 
In a multi-stakeholder environment such as Internet governance, a lack of stakeholder 
support for an organization’s control over a key infrastructure has been considered to be 
problematic. As Weinberg points out: 
“To the extent that its legitimacy was less secure, ICANN would be forced to concede 
greater autonomy to other actors. If its legitimacy collapsed entirely, it might see 
large segments of the community defecting to alternative root systems.”356 
In this context, it is interesting to observe how ICANN mobilized a whole series of different 
tactics to tackle its legitimacy problem. 
357
 For instance, soon after its incorporation, ICANN 
tried to calm tempers by positioning itself as a primarily technical body. One of the most 
prominent examples in constructing ICANN as a politically and normatively neutral body was 
brought forward by Esther Dyson, the first chair on ICANN’s board. In 1999, she claimed: 
“ICANN does not ‘aspire to address’ any Internet governance issues; in effect, it 
governs the plumbing, not the people. It has a very limited mandate to administer 
certain (largely technical) aspects of the Internet infrastructure in general and the 
Domain Name System in particular.”
358
 
A second strategy to bolster its legitimacy was ICANN’s attempt to conduct global online 
elections. In 2000, the board decided that five of its then nineteen members should be 
elected for two years by Internet users
359
 all around the world (“at-large”); each representing 
one of the five ICANN regions (including Africa, Asia/Australia/Pacific, Europe, Latin 
America/Caribbean, and North America).
360
 Funding was provided by the US Markle 
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Foundation
361 and online voting was outsourced to a global Internet election company 
(election.com). In total, 158,593 people registered to vote. After having received their 
personal identification number (PIN), 76,183 also activated their membership, and 34,035 
actually voted.
362
 It was especially in North America and Europe, where most of the public 
discussions came from, where ICANN’s candidates were all defeated by established critics. 
While Andy Müller-Maghun, the European winner of the election, was described as an 
“anarchist hacker” and member of the Computer Chaos Club, Karl Auerbach, the North 
American victor, was affiliated with the Boston Group.
363
 As a board member, together with 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Auerbach ultimately sued ICANN for denying access 
to corporate documents.
364
 As a result, the at-large election was effectively abolished. As 
Mueller points out: 
“The ‘Internet community consensus’ that ICANN had been claiming since its 
inception seemed not to exist. Following its decisive defeat in the elections, the 
ICANN management and board acted to contain the elected board members and 
minimize their impact. The bylaws were altered to keep the newly elected directors 
out of the selection process for new TLDs. A new executive committee of the board 
was formed that excluded the maverick members.”365 
However, for Weinberg, ICANN’s key strategy for gaining legitimacy was not the 
establishment of broad community consensus. Rather, it was its “institutional 
isomorphism;”
366
 the move to adapt the mores and structures of those entities it ultimately 
depended upon: state actors, big ISPs and root server operators. Neither of them had much 
experience with the Internet community’s anarchic tradition of “rough consensus.” They had 
their particular interests, and the best way to materialize them was “a structure that was 
elite-oriented, bureaucratized, and corporate-modelled, with privileged roles reserved for 
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governments and representatives of specific industry segments.”367 In this respect, one of 
most important beneficiaries was ICANN’s staff. As Weinberg writes: 
“ICANN staff, for their part, sought to maximize their own autonomy and to increase 
their own empires. In that connection, a role as neutral facilitator of the consensus 
emerging from an IETF-modelled process was less appealing to them than was a role 
steering a self-sufficient, self-perpetuating, staff-dominated, ever-growing 
organization.”
368
 
It is important to add that this process of institutional isomorphism was additionally 
bolstered by the immense increase in revenues over the last six years (see next section). 
Since ICANN is chartered as a nonprofit corporation, it simultaneously had to spend all of 
these additional revenues each year. As a result, ICANN started to bureaucratize itself. Just 
one example for this is the increasing number of multilingual documents that are 
simultaneously published on the ICANN Web site. 
However, even though ICANN was heavily engaged in finding a way to overcome its 
legitimacy problem over the years since its inception, this struggle is an ongoing project and 
has not been solved yet. 
2.1.3.3. Board of directors 
As was shown in the previous section, the creation of ICANN was the result of a complex 
process between a myriad of different actors. Unsurprisingly, this complexity is clearly 
reflected in ICANN’s organizational structure. Since its inception, ICANN’s bylaws have been 
amended 31 times.
369
 However, the board has consistently been the central decision-making 
body of the organization—even though the number of board members has changed 
frequently. 
Currently, there are 21 members on the board: 16 voting, and 5 non-voting members. All 
board members represent a specific group of constituencies that all have a stake in the 
overall coordination of the global DNS. Thus, the selection of the board shall ensure that at 
all times each of the five geographic regions
370
 shall have at least one voting member (not 
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including the President).371 
The Nominating Committee (NomCom) delegates eight voting members to the board. 
NomCom acts on behalf of the broad interests of the global Internet community as a whole. 
Therefore, it is composed of all other board member stakeholder groups. NomCom is 
responsible for the selection of all ICANN board members, except the President and the 
supporting organizations. 
The Address Supporting Organization (ASO) delegates two voting members to the board. 
ASO members act on behalf of the five existing Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), consisting 
of the African Network Information Centre (AfriNIC), the Asia Pacific Network Information 
Centre (APNIC), the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN), Latin American and 
Caribbean IP Address Regional Registry (LACNIC), RIPE Network Coordination Centre (RIPE 
NCC). RIRs receive Internet number resources (IP address blocks and AS numbers) from IANA 
and manage, distribute, and register them within their respective regions. 
 
Figure 7: ICANN Board of Directors
372
 
The Country-Code Names Supporting Organization (ccNSO) delegates two voting members to 
the board. The ccNSO represents ccTLD managers (managing the registration of domain 
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names under their respective ccTLD) who have agreed to be members of the ccNSO. 
However, a ccNSO member may resign from membership at any time. The ccNSO is 
responsible for global policies relating to ccTLDs. 
The Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) delegates two voting members to the 
board. The GNSO represents the entirety of all gTLD registries (managing the registration of 
domain names under their respective gTLD), registrars (selling domain names under their 
accredited gTLD and/or ccTLD) and commercial stakeholders such as Internet Service 
Provider (ISPs). GNSO is responsible for developing and recommending to the ICANN Board 
substantive policies relating to gTLDs. 
The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) delegates one voting members to the board. ALAC 
represents the individual Internet users within their Regional At-Large Organizations (RALO) 
and shall advice ICANN on issues that are of any interest for individual Internet users. 
The President serves as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ICANN and has one vote (ex 
officio). The President and CEO is in charge of all of ICANN’s activities and business. All other 
officers and staff have to report to him. (For a more in depth analysis of how ICANN’s 
previous Presidents and CEOs shaped the organization, see the following section). 
The Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) delegates one non-voting member to the 
board. In principle, the GAC is open to all national governments and distinct economies as 
recognized in international fora. On invitation of the GAC, also multinational governmental 
organizations and treaty organizations may participate. The GAC advices ICANN on activities 
that relate to concerns of governments, particularly where ICANN’s policies interact with 
various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues. 
The Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC) delegates one non-voting member to 
the board. Membership to the RSSAC is open to each operator of a root name server.
373
 
RSSAC provides advice to the board about operational requirements of root name servers, 
including host hardware capacities, operating systems and name server software versions, 
network connectivity and physical environment. The RSSAC also gives advice on security 
aspects of the root name server system and reviews the number, location, and distribution 
of root name servers considering the total system performance, robustness, and reliability. 
The Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) delegates one non-voting member to 
the board. Chair and members are appointed by the board for a three-year term. The SSAC 
advises the ICANN community and board on matters relating to the security and integrity of 
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the DNS. In doing so, the SSAC is responsible to communicate on security matters with the 
Internet technical community, the operators and managers of critical DNS infrastructure 
services, the root name server operator community, the TLD registries and registrars and 
others as events and developments dictate. Furthermore, SSAC shall conduct threat 
assessment and risk analysis of the Internet naming and address allocation services to assess 
where the principal threats to stability and security lie. The committee shall also 
communicate with those who have direct responsibility for DNS security matters (IETF, 
RSSAC, RIRs, name registries, etc.), publish periodical reports and make policy 
recommendations to the board. 
The Technical Liaison Group (TLG) delegates one non-voting member to the board. The TLG 
shall consist of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the 
International Telecommunications Union’s Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-
T), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB). The 
TLG shall connect the board with technical advice on specific matters adequate to ICANN’s 
activities. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) delegates 1 non-voting member to the board. 
There is no more information about the specific responsibilities of IETF in ICANN’s bylaws. 
2.1.3.4. Previous Presidents and CEOs 
To date, all of ICANN’s Presidents and CEOs have left their characteristic mark on the 
organization.
374
 This becomes obvious when looking at their overall accomplishments while 
being in office. 
Appointed by the interim board chaired under Esther Dyson, the first President and CEO of 
ICANN was Mike Roberts (1998-2001).
375
 Roberts had an academic background in 
information technology and a sound understanding of the Internet community’s mores. His 
tenure was characterized by a strong commitment to broad community consensus which is 
clearly expressed in his warning farewell remarks as interim President and CEO: 
“Frequently, as is the case with several of the agenda items for today, we must seek 
that broad middle ground which represents consensus. The Board must strip away 
the fevered advocacy, the impure exhortations, the arguments from limited 
knowledge and find the essence of the contending views on which it may make a 
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reasoned decision.”376 
Roberts was followed by Stuart Lynn (2001-2003).377 Similar to his predecessor, Lynn was 
closely related to the Internet community’s open approach to communication. During his 
time in office, Lynn not only reformed considerable parts of ICANN’s structures, but also 
tried to give every stakeholder a voice in this process.
378
 Unsurprisingly, it was also during 
Lynn’s term as President and CEO that ICANN successfully conducted global online elections 
for five of the then nineteen board members. However, it was also under Lynn that Karl 
Auerbach, the North American winner of the elections, sued ICANN for denying access to 
corporate documents. 
ICANN’s third President and CEO was Paul Twomey (2003-2009).379 As opposed to his 
predecessors, Twomey had both a business and governmental background. He had 
previously served as a member of ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) (see 
below). He represented ICANN in international fora such as the Tunis WSIS, and played an 
important role in strengthening ICANN’s GAC. After Twomey announced his departure, Peter 
Dengate Thrush, then chairman of the board, assessed Twomey’s time as President and CEO 
as follows: 
“He was involved in its set up, helped establish the role of governments in his term as 
founding chair of the GAC, and then was its longest serving CEO. He guided the 
organization through the World Summit on the Information Society in 2005 and has 
been one of the strongest and most persuasive advocates for the multi-stakeholder 
model of Internet governance.”
380
 
Probably one of ICANN’s most controversially discussed Presidents and CEOs was Rod 
Beckstrom.
381
 Previously being a Silicon Valley entrepreneur and author, in 2008 Beckstrom 
became director of the US National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC) at the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). After less than a year, Beckstrom stepped down, complaining that 
the intelligence community not only dominated most national cyber efforts, but also made it 
difficult for the DHS to do their job and work together with stakeholders at all possible levels 
of federal, state and local government, and the private sector.382 In 2009, Beckstrom became 
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President and CEO of ICANN. The expectations were high, not least due to a book he had co-
authored, in which he compared leaderless starfish models of organization on the one hand 
with leader-orientated spider models on the other.
383
 Notwithstanding, soon voices were 
being raised that Beckstrom seemed more like a spider that was concentrating more and 
more power on top.384 However, even though it is difficult to charge Beckstrom’s 
achievements while he is still in office, Klimburg holds that ICANN under Beckstrom 
characteristically started to extent its role as an international security actor.
385
 
2.1.3.5. Economic capabilities 
Additionally to looking at votes, membership, responsibilities and individual persons, we also 
need to get an awareness of the different stakeholders’ economic capabilities. While 
acknowledging that socio-cultural capabilities (such as individual knowledge, skills or 
education)
386
 also play an important role in securitization theory, in the following section, we 
will primarily focus on material capabilities. 
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Figure 8: ICANN Revenues vs. Expenses (1999-2011)
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To get an impression of the different stakeholder’s economic capabilities, we look at their 
financial contributions to ICANN’s total revenue (as exposed in ICANN’s current operating 
plan and budget).
388
 ICANN’s operating activities are almost entirely financed by generic 
registries and registrars. Due to an increased demand for domain names over the last couple 
of years, ICANN’s revenues have increased by a factor of about ten every year since 2006. 
Due to the fact that ICANN is a nonprofit corporation under the California NPBCL, it 
simultaneously had to increase its expenditures. This not least 
From the expected 2012 total revenue of $69.8 million, a share of $34.8 million are expected 
to be transferred from gTLD registries, and $30.9 million from registrars that have been 
accredited by ICANN and the respective gTLD and ccTLD registries. The remaining $4.1 
million are acquired from ccTLD registries ($1.6 million), sponsorships ($900,000), RIRs 
($823,000), and IDN ccTLDs ($780,000).
389
 
While RIRs and ccTLD contribute annually, gTLD registries hold individual temporary 
contracts in which different types of fees are determined. Essentially, there are fixed and 
transaction-based fee contracts. Fixed fees are paid annually by eight gTLDs. However, from 
an estimated total amount of $18 million, only $90,500 can be expected to come from TLDs 
other than .com—which is run by Verisign. Similarly, as regards transaction-based fees, from 
an estimate of $16.7 million, a share of $10.5 million can be expected to be transferred from 
the .net registry—which is also run by Verisign.
390
 
Along with gTLDs, registrars provide the second biggest source for ICANN’s revenues. 
Currently there are over 960 registrars that are accredited by both ICANN and the respective 
g/ccTLD registries. Most of these relationships are governed by a uniform Registrar 
Accreditation Agreement (RAA), with transaction-based fees representing the bulk of all 
registrar contributions.
391
 
With gTLD registries and registrars contributing the lions share to ICANN’s total revenue, it 
could be argued that both ASO and GNSO also have the most capabilities to conduct a 
successful securitization. However, before this hypothesis can be confirmed, we first need to 
proceed to our final case study and investigate an area specific instance of securitization. 
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2.2. Synthesis 
The aim of this part was to set the scene for the following case study. In doing so, we first 
gave a short overview of the historic processes around the Internet in general, and ICANN in 
particular. We argued that a breakdown of the DNS can potentially have significant 
implications for social layer referent objects such as “society,” “the regime,” or “the 
economy” (which is, again, in turn linked to “state” and “society”). Moreover, the board of 
ICANN’s directors was defined and characterized as a platform for potential securitizing 
actors. Ultimately, we gave an impression of the stakeholder’s (primarily economic) 
capabilities. 
85 
 
3. DNS-CERT as a Case for Securitization in Internet Governance 
In the previous part we argued that a breakdown of the DNS can potentially have significant 
implications for social layer referent objects such as “society,” “the regime,” or “the 
economy” (which is, again, in turn linked to “state” and “society”). We defined multi-
stakeholder collaboration as the main political constellation in Internet governance and held 
that the ICANN board consists of all relevant stakeholders who could potentially conduct a 
securitizing move. The aim of this part is to apply the theoretical concepts that were set out 
above and ask, how the Copenhagen school would explain a case of cyber securitization in 
the field of Internet governance. 
3.1. Data 
Sticking to the Copenhagen school’s methodological approach, our analysis was mostly 
conducted on texts that are central in the sense that if security discourse is operative in this 
community, it should be expected to materialize in this text because this occasion is 
sufficiently important. In this context, most of the data we are using here is publicly available 
and accessible via the Internet. Additionally, we conducted a series of qualitative interviews 
with experts working in the field of Internet governance. 
Also, the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University has produced a very 
valuable and comprehensive review of ICANN’s accountability and transparency.392 The 
following part will therefore make heavy use of the review’s appendix on the DNS-CERT 
proposal.
393
 Building upon the results delivered through both the Berkman study and our 
own primary research, we finally apply the Copenhagen school’s securitization theory. 
3.2. What’s in a CERT 
Before running a case study on DNS-CERT, it is worth to pause for a moment and explain 
what this acronym actually stands for. As should be clear by now, DNS refers to the Domain 
Name System. A CERT, however, is the short-hand for an organization called Computer 
Emergency Response Team.
394
 The first CERT was created in response to the 1988 Morris 
worm incident. This worm caused around 10% of all then connected US computers to 
disconnect from the Net. Since most of the network security experts used the Net as their 
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main means of communication, the breakdown of large parts of their infrastructure made it 
difficult for them to conduct a coordinated response.
395
 Consequently, DARPA called for a 
single point of contact for Internet security issues and funded a CERT coordination center 
(CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon University. 
In essence, a CERT can be described as an information hub that transfers information about 
security incidences to the right people.
396
 In 1998, a CERT has been defined as 
“a team that coordinates and supports the response to security incidents [any 
adverse event which compromises some aspect of computer or network security] 
that involve sites within a defined constituency [the group of users, sites, networks or 
organizations served by the team].”397 
Today CERT/CC has links to all other CERTs worldwide. Even though many countries have 
their own national CERTs,
398
 the size of a CERT is not restricted to states. In fact, CERTs can 
also be found at other levels as well (e.g., at the sub-unit or regional level). CERTs work 
closely together with the Internet community and take important steps to prevent future 
incidences. The mission of a CERT can be defined in five distinct categories: 
1. Provide a reliable, trusted, 24-hour, single point of contact for emergencies. 
2. Facilitate communication among experts working to solve security problems. 
3. Serve as a central point for identifying and correcting vulnerabilities in computer 
systems.  
4. Maintain close ties with research activities and conduct research to improve the 
security of existing systems. 
5. Initiate proactive measures to increase awareness and understanding of information 
security and computer security issues throughout the community of network users 
and service providers.399 
3.3. Basic Documents 
ICANN’s role in global DNS security is specified in its bylaws and agreements. As was 
mentioned in the previous part, ICANN has the mission to “ensure the stable and secure 
operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.”
400
 In this respect, the first core 
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principle by which ICANN’s decisions and actions should be guided is: 
“Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global 
interoperability of the Internet.”
401
 
Through the 2009 AoC with the DoC, ICANN commits itself to preserving security, stability 
and resiliency. In doing so, it agrees to pay particular attention to: 
“(a) security, stability and resiliency matters, both physical and network, relating to 
the secure and stable coordination of the Internet DNS; (b) ensuring appropriate 
contingency planning; and (c) maintaining clear processes.”
402
 
In this context, ICANN published its first draft Plan for Enhanced Internet Security, Stability 
and Resiliency in May 2009.
403
 The plan clarified ICANN’s competencies in respect to other 
Internet security actors and was intended to serve as a foundation for establishing future 
security programs and activities such as improving the root zone management and building 
upon existing Internet security community efforts to effectively respond to DNS threats. 
In February 2010, ICANN released its final draft July 2010-June 2013 Strategic Plan.
404
 The 
plan set out four strategic focus areas, with DNS stability and security being one of them. On 
the strategic projects layer under this item, the establishment of a DNS-CERT was 
mentioned. Later on, it is stated in the document: 
“ICANN will work in partnership with other organizations to develop an approach to the 
establishment of a DNS CERT in order to address one of the broader issues of Internet 
security. This system would enable a more coordinated and effective response to 
incidents and attacks on the DNS. In addition, ICANN will be working with the Internet 
community to enhance contingency planning and exercises to address risks and threats 
to the DNS.”
405
 
Around the same time, two more security-focused policy documents were issued: The Proposed 
Strategic Initiatives for Improved DNS Security, Stability and Resiliency
406
 as well as the Global 
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DNS-CERT Business Case.
407
 These two documents can be said to form the core of ICANN’s DNS-
CERT proposal. 
3.3.1. Proposed Strategic Initiative 
ICANN’s Proposed Strategic Initiatives
408
 paper starts out by arguing that the global DNS is 
increasingly threatened. It claims that “the DNS exists in an environment of increasing threats 
and risks.”
409
 By referring to three press releases—two from the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA), and one from the US Information Technology Sector 
Coordinating Council (ITSCC)—the document points out that, over the past view years, “[s]everal 
calls to action on addressing and mitigating systemic DNS risks have been made.”
410
 
By referring to its bylaws and commitments, ICANN asserts that it has to respond to these calls 
by undertaking efforts to preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS. In this 
respect, the paper first identifies three major types of current security risks to the DNS:  
1. Malicious activity risks such as Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS attacks) that usually 
lead to root and TLD server overload, or cache poisoning whereby Internet users are 
misdirected to Web sites with fraudulent code. 
2. Technical risks including vulnerabilities in the DNS protocol or problems that might 
arise from changes to the root level of the DNS, for instance during the transition 
from IPv4 to IPv6 or the implementation of DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). 
3. Organizational failures include the potential disruptions of DNS operations that are 
caused if key organizations for the DNS (such as ICANN, root server operators, TLD 
registries and registrars) no longer perform their function. Therefore, system level 
provisions must be made for contingencies. 
After having grouped the existing risks, the paper moves on and proposes two strategic 
initiatives in response to these threats. The first refers to the necessity for community-wide 
DNS risk assessment, contingency planning and the establishment of response capabilities 
and system-wide DNS exercise programs. This shall be facilitated by a specialized expert 
advisory group. 
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In its second initiative, ICANN calls for the creation of a DNS-CERT; a central point of contact 
for all key stakeholders, including DNS operators and users, vendors, security researchers, 
and incident responders. The details to this initiative are presented in the Global DNS-CERT 
Business Case.
411
 
3.3.2. DNS-CERT Business Case 
In the introduction to the Global DNS-CERT Business Case,
412
 special attention is paid to the 
Internet’s role as a global means of communication and its impact on a broad variety of different 
actors, ranging from the individual to companies and public institutions: 
“Relied upon not only by individuals, the Internet provides services necessary to the 
functioning of governments, corporations and financial institutions, not to mention 
schools, medical facilities and merchants small and large.”
413
 
Wide-scale coordinated attacks against the DNS, it is held, could potentially cause 
“significant economic and political fallout.”414 If these attacks cannot be rapidly detected by a 
central point of technical and policy coordination, this may result in “lasting economic 
consequences.”
415
 However, referring to the 2009 Global DNS Security, Stability, and 
Resiliency Symposium,
416
 “[i]nformation sharing within the DNS community is sorely 
lacking.”417 This “lack of situational awareness among incident responders could leave critical 
assets, systems, networks and functions vulnerable.”
418
 
Therefore, in order to overcome the problem of insufficient coordination, two constraints 
must be removed. The first one refers to resource constraints, especially those in lesser-
developed regions of the world. This was also pointed out at the Global DNS Security, 
Stability, and Resiliency Symposium: 
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“resource constrained organizations have difficulty establishing networks of 
professionals to reach out and solicit information from. An organization will 
instinctively turn to its professional network, either in reaction to an event/incident or 
for proactive assistance. It is imperative that organizations know where to begin 
establishing their networks.”419 
The second constraint refers to geographically limited efforts to share information on a 
global level: 
“An effective CERT capability for the DNS should not be limited [by] geography 
because of the dispersed nature of operations. In this sense, what might ordinarily be 
considered to be critical national infrastructure may have impacts far beyond a 
national border.”
420
 
By drawing its lessons from previous cyber attacks in which the DNS was involved (including 
cache poisoning and cases of botnet attacks),
421
 the paper finally calls for the need of a “DNS 
security response capability, as well as the wide range of contingencies and stakeholders that 
may be involved.”422 This need could be sufficiently met by creating a global DNS-CERT 
capability. 
The foundational idea or vision statement of the DNS-CERT would be to “enhance the 
security, stability and resiliency of the Global DNS.”
423
 The corresponding mission statement 
of the organization would be to: 
“Ensure DNS operators and supporting organizations have a security coordination 
center with sufficient expertise and resources to enable timely and efficient response 
to threats to the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.”
424
 
In carrying out this mission, the DNS-CERT would essentially be dedicated to three main goals 
and objectives: 
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1. Goal: Gain situational awareness and share information. 
Objective: Establish communications means and procedures to maximum number of 
players; exercise regularly. 
2. Goal: Improve coordination within the DNS operational community. 
Objective: Enable measurement and facilitate information sharing about the health, 
stability and resiliency of the DNS. Engage in appropriate situations: support 
contingency planning and exercises; undertake After Action Reporting (AAR). Engage 
with DNS-OARC and RISG, among others collaborators, to leverage expertise and 
existing operational response capabilities related to information sharing and analysis. 
3. Goal: Improve coordination with the broader security community. 
Objective: Establish relationships with key partners (CERTs, security researchers, key 
security lists, vendors, antivirus companies, law enforcement and governments); 
participate in contingency planning and exercises; engage in appropriate situations; 
undertake After Action Reporting (AAR).
425
 
The organization’s operations should be reviewed regularly and can be adapted according to 
“constituency needs, funding, exigencies, policy drivers and technical capability of the CERT 
itself.”426 In essence, the DNS-CERT team will provide both reactive (e.g., 365x24x7 point of 
contact, incident handling coordination or direct assistance) and proactive services (e.g., 
watch and warning services or education and training)
427
 and will act as a central point of 
coordination (see graph) for 
1. Root server operators and supporting organization 
2. Registries and registrars 
3. DNS vendors 
4. Other interested and qualified parties, as identified by the DNS-CERT management.
428
 
Based on the CSIRT development guidelines suggested by the CERT/CC, in the remaining 
section of the proposal, ICANN sets out the details about how to establish the DNS-CERT. 
ICANN would provide initial funding (annually $4.2 million), “until the organization can stand 
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on its own.”429 Certainly, the proposed annual amount would fit with ICANN’s need to spend 
considerable amounts of its annual revenues obtained from gTLD registries and registrars. 
 
Figure 9: DNS-CERT proposed structure
430
 
 
3.4. DNS-CERT viewed through the Cyber Lens 
Public comment for the draft 2010-2013 Proposed Strategic Initiative was open between 1 
December 2009 and 21 January 2010. 431 As the Berkman report states, during this period, 
interest for the DNS-CERT proposal was relatively low. However, most of the comments 
received were predominantly supportive.
432
 Between 12 February and 25 March 2010 both 
the Proposed Strategic Initiatives and the DNS-Business Case were released for public 
comment,433 with only one comment related to DNS-CERT. The Berkman report highlights 
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that “the DNS-CERT proposal remained largely uncontroversial until ICANN’s meeting in 
Nairobi in March 2010.”
434
 
3.4.1. Nairobi Speech Act 
The peace around the DNS-CERT proposal was suddenly interrupted when ICANN’s CEO and 
President Rod Beckstrom gave his state of the DNS address in front of the Governmental 
Advisory Committee (GAC) on 9 March 2010.435 It is important to emphasize here that this 
very speech constitutes the centrepiece of our study. In order to provide a comprehensive 
overview, we will therefore deliver the quote at full length: 
“I want to share one last piece of information with you, an observation I feel 
obligated to share as the CEO of ICANN, particularly under the Affirmations of 
Commitments, paragraphs 3 and 9.2, which refer to the security of a domain name 
system.  
Paragraph 3 refers to ICANN’s role and requirement to preserve the security of a 
domain name system globally. What I want to share with you as a representative of 
many countries of the world is that the domain name system is under attack today as 
it has never been before. I have personally consulted with over 20 CEO’s of the top 
Registries and top Registrars globally, all of whom are seeing increasing attacks and 
complexity of attacks and who are extremely concerned.  
The domain name system is more fragile and vulnerable today than it has ever been. 
It could stop at any given point in time literally. It has never stopped, it has been 
slowed down through attacks and the Kominsky [sic] exploit that was disclosed only 
18 months or so ago could have been used to fundamentally cripple the domain 
name system. That system is used 1 trillion times per day and your economies 
depend upon it. It can stop or it can materially be damaged and harmed. It is under 
attack.  
Parts of that system are only in your countries and I’m going to be writing you a letter 
and asking you for what is happening in the domain name system in your countries 
because we’re seeing new levels of wild carding that is occurring at the telecom 
service provider level, synthesis of domain name system providers interrupting DNS 
requests and providing false data and information for commercial or other purposes. 
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But the system is under full scale attack and I am extremely concerned as the CEO of 
ICANN I want to let you know that.  
We’re all in this together and I have met with the heads of cyber security or technical 
infrastructure of 3 of the largest counties on earth who are concerned as well. I’m 
sharing this because I’m gravely concerned and we need your help. So we’re going to 
be asking you for your advice on domain name security and on the DNS SERT [sic] and 
what can be done and particularly to learn the lessons from you as well. What has 
been accomplished in your countries?  
I have experience with SERTS [sic] in several countries but we need to learn more. So 
that will be coming and I just want to express my concern to this group because I 
don’t want to wait until Brussels. Thank you.”
436
 
To cut a long story short, what Beckstrom is really saying here is that, as the appointed CEO 
and President of the global preserver of the DNS (ICANN), he is officially obliged to urgently 
inform the countries he represents about the fact that the DNS is more threatened today 
than it was ever before. Even worse, it could stop at any given point in time literally. Since 
the countries’ economies are using the system 1 trillion times per day, a breakdown of the 
DNS would have significant implications for all humankind. Beckstrom adds additional 
authority to his argument by claiming that he has not only talked to over 20 CEO’s of the top 
Registries and top Registrars worldwide, but that his concerns are equally shared by the 
heads of cyber security or technical infrastructure of 3 of the largest counties on earth. 
The urgency in Beckstrom’s words calls for immediate action: threats against the global DNS 
have reached a point of no return; if we do not handle them in time, the states’ economies 
will necessarily break down soon. 
3.4.2. Reactions 
Beckstrom’s speech was widely perceived and provoked strong reactions ranging from 
support to skepticism.
437
 The public comment period for both the Proposed Strategic 
Initiative and the DNS-CERT Business Case was extended. While the Strategic Initiative now 
only received 13 comments, a total of 25 comments were brought forward just for the 
Business Case: 
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“Three of ICANN’s advisory committees and supporting organizations submitted 
comments: ALAC, ccNSO, and gNSO. Five commercial stakeholders submitted 
comments: AT&T, Net Choicer, PayPal, PRESENSE Technologies GmbH, and USCIB. 
Governments, national CERTs, registry operators, TLD associations, and other Internet 
organizations submitted the remainder of the comments.”438 
Without going into much detail about the whole range of different reactions that followed 
Nairobi, we will take a shortcut and build on already existing material. Most prominently, this 
study will draw on the results generated by the Berkman institute. After analyzing existing 
online material and conducting high-level expert interviews, the Berkman team usefully 
grouped the reactions into three overall categories. Consequently, these categories read as 
follows:
439
 
1. Substantive Issues referred to (1) questions about whether a DNS-CERT was needed 
at all, “given the current landscape of DNS security risks.”
440
 To answer this question 
sufficiently makes it necessary not only to access a whole wealth of incidence 
information, but also to assess it correctly. (2) Also, this point touches upon questions 
about whether, “given the existing knowledge about the threats to DNS,”
441
 a DNS-
CERT should actually be established. 
2. The issue about ICANN’s DNS security mandate mainly concerned its role in the 
proposed organization. It was feared that, (1) through sponsoring the creation of a 
new security actor, ICANN could broaden its competencies beyond being a mere 
coordinating and non-operating body. In this context, (2) further concerns were 
raised as to whether ICANN has the right to dispose of considerable parts of its 
revenues ($4.2 million) independently from the stakeholders who actually contribute 
them.
442
 
3. The procedural issues that were addressed involved (1) complaints about the lacking 
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openness and transparency. Beckstrom did neither inform other stakeholders about 
his intention to speak about a DNS-CERT, nor did he disclose the names of the 
registries and registrars he was referring to in this speech. Moreover, (2) community 
members reacted disturbed about the lack of stakeholder participation and open 
dialogue during the development of the proposals. It was objected that Beckstrom 
did not sufficiently consult with the community through a bottom-up, knowledge- 
and consensus-based multi-stakeholder approach. This point was also confirmed by 
one of the interviewees to this study, who indicated that it was a rush to a solution 
without really reaching an agreement before. 
3.4.3. Analysis 
How does the Copenhagen school deal with Beckstrom’s attempted securitization? Before 
we can answer this question, we first need to clarify whether Beckstrom’s speech act 
qualified as a case for securitization in the cyber sector. In fact, Beckstrom not only identified 
the DNS as an existentially threatened (technical) referent object, but also linked it to the 
state and its economy. It could also be argued that this linkage is even stronger by Beckstrom 
calling himself a “representative of many countries of the world.” However, one must keep 
in mind here that Beckstrom is not talking to all ICANN stakeholders, but only to a little 
fraction: namely states and intergovernmental organizations as assembled in the 
Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). We do not know whether ICANN’s President and 
CEO also calls himself a representative of many gTLDs when speaking to the GNSO, or of all 
individual Internet users in the world when consulting with ALAC. Thus, while we can indeed 
confirm that Beckstrom’s Nairobi speech linked the logical with the social layer of 
cyberspace, we cannot be certain about whether this link was additionally strengthened 
through Beckstrom calling himself the representative of a certain stakeholder group. 
Having clarified that Beckstrom’s speech act indeed qualifies as a case for securitization in 
the cyber sector, we can now contextualize the results from the Berkman study with 
securitization theory and try to explain why Beckstrom’s securitizing move ultimately 
misfired. This is done by recalling the Copenhagen school’s three facilitating conditions for a 
successful securitization. 
For a securitization to be successful, it is necessary to fulfill three unconditional criteria: (1) 
the sector-specific security grammar has to be applied,
443
 (2) the necessary capabilities must 
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be held,444 and (3) the security threat must be commonly perceived as such.445 If these 
conditions are not entirely met, the securitizing move necessarily misfires. 
3.4.3.1. Security Grammar 
As regards the sector-specific security grammar, for the cyber sector we distinguished 
between (a) hypersecuritization, (b) everyday security practice, and (c) technification. As 
Hansen and Nissenbaum pointed out, not all of them must be met. However, in order to 
fulfill the first criteria, at least one of these three sub-grammars must be applied. 
Recalling the concept of (a) hypersecuritization, we need to look at the striking manner in 
which cyber security discourse hinges on multi-dimensional cyber disaster scenarios that pack 
a long list of severe threats into a monumental cascading sequence and the fact that neither 
of these scenarios has so far taken place. This concept was opposed to the tendency both to 
exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures. In the case of Beckstrom’s 
Nairobi speech we find no clear indication for a hypersecuritization. One could point at 
Beckstrom’s claim that the DNS “is used 1 trillion times per day” and that our “economies 
depend upon it.” However, there is no real reference to any multi-dimensional cyber disaster 
scenarios. If there is no instance of hypersecuritization, is there some sort of exaggeration in 
Beckstrom’s speech? Obviously, there is one. As was observed by the Berkman report, 
Beckstrom’s claim the DNS “could stop at any given point in time literally” was widely 
perceived as “inflammatory” and “alarming.” It was stated that 
“the tone of the message could be considered somewhat inflammatory [. . .] Many 
people in the room felt that Beckstrom was speaking out of turn and disregarding the 
work the community is already undertaking to ensure the stability and the security of 
the DNS.”
446
 
If Beckstrom really exaggerated in his speech act, why did he do that and what were his 
intentions? Were there any intentions at all? Securitization theory does not provide any 
answers to these questions. It discards hypersecuritization on grounds that Beckstrom’s 
speech was an exaggeration, but it does not try to explain why he actually exaggerated. 
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As regards (b) technification, one could argue that Beckstrom tried to add authority to his 
argument by claiming that he had not only talked to “over 20 CEO’s of the top Registries and 
top Registrars globally,” but that he had also “met with the heads of cyber security or 
technical infrastructure of 3 of the largest counties on earth who are concerned as well.” By 
claiming that experts would share his opinion, Beckstrom tried to give his utterance the 
appearance of objectivity. However, in the case of Nairobi, this tactic failed. The multiple 
stakeholders in ICANN started to doubt and asked Beckstrom to be clear about who he was 
actually referring to. However, as was set out in the Berkman study, 
“Beckstrom [. . .] refused to disclose the names of the registry and registrar members 
with whom he consulted.”
447
 
This triggers interesting questions. Why did he refuse to provide the names? Was it a secret 
or just a bluff? Unfortunately, the Copenhagen school does not deliver a satisfying answer 
here. Since there was doubt among the multiple stakeholders about Beckstrom’s 
technification, he obviously failed to apply this sub-form correctly. 
As was mentioned above, an analyst of securitization should not be expected to reveal 
underlying motives, hidden agenda, or such, discourse analysis can only uncover one thing: 
discourse. But what if there is no open discourse? The Copenhagen school does not give an 
answer to this question. 
Ultimately, we did not find any reference to (c) everyday security practice. Claiming that the 
DNS “is used 1 trillion times per day and that our economies depend upon it” does not really 
have a direct link to “normal” individuals’ experiences as would be necessary for a case of 
everyday security practice. 
3.4.3.2. Capabilities 
After having identified the sector-specific grammars of security, we can now look at the 
authority of Beckstrom as a securitizing actor. We argue that he derives his authority only 
through the stakeholders on the board. If one—everything else being equal—defined 
capabilities narrowly in terms of economic capabilities, these stakeholders would almost all 
be concentrated in GNSO (contributing the highest amount of money to ICANN’s revenues). 
This is most obvious in the Nairobi reactions challenging ICANN’s right to dispose of 
considerable parts of its revenues ($4.2 million) independently from the stakeholders who 
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actually contribute them. This becomes clear when looking at the statement posted by the 
Canadian ccTLD registry: 
“There are concerns as well with respect to the manner in which ICANN has allocated 
the budget for the DNS-CERT, which is estimated at $ 4.2 million USD. This is a 
considerable financial commitment to undertake without a thorough examination of 
existing organisations and community consultation to determine if the money could 
be better spent supporting other initiatives. Given that ICANN’s revenue is nearly 
entirely generated from community stakeholders, it concerns us that ICANN would 
attempt to undertake such a substantial financial commitment without proper prior 
consultation with those who will ultimately be responsible for funding the initiative. 
We also question whether the community should be paying for something which 
would be better or preferably managed by another organisation.”
448
 
Therefore, we argue that, without the support of the most capable stakeholders in play, 
Beckstrom’s unilateral securitizing move was predestinated to misfire.  
3.4.3.3. Security Threat 
The last facilitating condition in securitization theory was the necessity that the identified 
security threat must be commonly perceived as such. A threat does not exist independently 
from the actors involved in the securitizing move, but is inter-subjectively constructed by 
them. In the case of the DNS-CERT proposal, the threat was not clearly defined. Beckstrom 
claimed that the DNS were “under attack today as it has never been before.” However, he 
did not deliver any details. When asked to provide the information that would be necessary 
to assess this high level of threats sufficiently, Beckstrom replied 
“that many registries have experienced increases in botnet attacks; but none have, so 
far, been willing to come forth and share their data [. . .] It would be very helpful if we 
could work together to gather additional data on attacks on registries, and on how 
that information is being shared and measured on a global basis. It would greatly 
contribute to our joint efforts to evaluate the seriousness of the threat and 
coordinate our forces more effectively to meet it.”449 
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4. Conclusion 
In the first part of this thesis we set out a framework to tackle questions about cyber 
security. In the second part, we tried to provide the background against which we could 
conduct our final case study. After applying the Copenhagen school’s concept of 
securitization to our cyber case, we can conclude that Beckstrom’s speech act on the DNS-
CERT proposal misfired entirely. In fact, none of the three facilitating conditions was met. 
Beckstrom did neither succeed in applying the sector-specific security grammar 
(hypersecuritization, technification or everyday security practice), nor did he hold sufficient 
capabilities to unilaterally act. Furthermore, he did not provide any information that would 
have convinced his audience of an existential threat to DNS security. 
As a result, DNS-CERT was soon removed from the agenda. However, it did not disappear 
altogether. It rather seems that the idea has taken on a new form.450 In January 2011, the DNS 
Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) was established by ALAC, ccNSO, GNSO 
and NRO. Its aim is to examine the severity and frequency of threats, to review ongoing 
processes to mitigate these threats and to identify possible gaps in response to them.
451
 
Additionally, in April 2011, ICANN appointed Jeff Moss, the founder of DEFCON (the world’s 
largest hacker conference), as its Vice-President and Chief Security Officer. Beckstrom 
characterized Moss as someone who “has the in-depth insider’s knowledge that can only 
come from fighting in the trenches of the on-going war against cyber threats.”
452
 
What does that tell us about the general question posed in the introduction to this study: 
Who can speak security in a multi-stakeholder collaboration such as ICANN? The 
disappointing answer is: not much. We have indeed identified a couple of continuities in the 
case of ICANN. We were able to point at continuing efforts to fight inbuilt legitimacy 
problems (through technification of core competences, global elections and institutional 
isomorphism). We also saw that previously serving Presidents and CEO’s of ICANN had the 
chance to leave their characteristic mark on the organization. Moreover, we have shown that 
some actors (not states!) contribute more to the overall budget than others. Through our 
case study, we have ultimately found that ICANN’s President and CEO was not able to 
present the DNS as legitimately threatened, even though he linked it to the economy being 
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the legitimate referent at the social top end of our cyberspace pyramid. But do these 
observations qualify as specific features of multi-stakeholder collaboration? No, they do not. 
Therefore, future work needs to be done on other multi-stakeholder collaborations not only 
outside ICANN, but also outside Internet governance. Thus, one of the crucial questions for 
our future research is to identify areas with other multi-stakeholder model and compare 
them across (security) sectors. 
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Abstract: 
Das grundlegende Ziel dieser Studie ist es, charakteristische Eigenschaften für Multi-Stakeholder 
Collaborations ausfindig zu machen. Am Beispiel von Internet Governance (genauer gesagt von 
Domain Name System Governance) soll dies unter Anwendung des Securitization-Konzeptes der 
Kopenhagener Schule erfolgen. Unter Anwendung der Theorie im Fall von DNS-CERT wird gehofft, 
dass bestimmte Merkmale festgemacht werden, die anschließend auch in anderen Zusammenhängen 
untersucht werden können. Darüber hinaus versucht diese Studie den Blick auf das Kopenhagener 
Konzept von Cyber Securitization zu schärfen, indem es ein Vier-Schichten Modell für den Cyberspace 
spezifiziert, mit je einer physischen, logischen, informationellen und sozialen Schicht. 
 
The overall aim of this study is to detect some specific characteristics for multi-stakeholder 
collaboration. This shall be achieved by applying the Copenhagen school’s concept of cyber 
securitization to the area of Internet governance (more precisely Domain Name System governance). 
By looking at DNS-CERT as a case for securitization in Internet governance, it is hoped to find some 
specific features that could eventually be detected in other areas as well. Also, this study tries to 
sharpen the Copenhagen school’s concept of cyber securitization in that it specifies a four-layer model 
for cyberspace, including a physical, logical, content, and social layer. 
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